

TROISIÈME COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL DE L'ASSOCIATION

EUROPEAN NETWORK OF JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY

Paris : 2, 3 et 4 novembre 2017

Peu connue en France, la philosophie japonaise se constitue, au moins à partir de l'ère Meiji (1868-1912), comme volonté de dialogue avec les grandes traditions philosophiques occidentales. À l'heure où une accélération sans précédent des échanges en tout genre se produit au niveau mondial, la nécessité d'un dialogue philosophique interculturel ne se trouve que davantage confirmée. Pour ces raisons, dans le cadre de son troisième colloque international, l'association European Network of Japanese Philosophy souhaite interroger la possibilité et les modalités de la mise en œuvre d'un tel dialogue. *Qu'a-t-on à gagner lorsqu'on adopte volontairement en philosophie une approche comparatiste interculturelle ? Quels sont les écueils et les limites d'une telle approche ? En quel sens la philosophie japonaise peut-elle offrir un paradigme du comparatisme en philosophie ?*

En instruisant ces différentes questions, ce colloque présente un double objectif. Il s'agit, d'une part, de mieux faire connaître la philosophie japonaise dans ses différents aspects et, d'autre part, d'encourager la démarche comparative en philosophie dont on peut constater un certain renouveau au niveau mondial, mais qui demeure encore trop timide en Europe. C'est le défi que souhaite relever cette manifestation académique inédite en France, soutenue par l'Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales, le Centre d'études japonaises, l'UFR de philosophie de l'université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, l'Institut universitaire de France, l'Institut de recherches philosophiques, le Centre Philosophies et rationalités et la Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

Dans cette optique, le colloque réunira des japonologues et des philosophes de douze pays européens et non-européens autour de questions qui concernent des thèmes aussi variés que la philosophie de la nature, la philosophie de la religion, la philosophie du langage, l'esthétique, l'éthique, la métaphysique et la philosophie comparée.

Takako SAITŌ, *Présidente du comité d'organisation*

Laurentiu ANDREI, *Coordonnateur principal*

ENOJP

The European Network of Japanese Philosophy (ENOJP) was founded by a group of scholars in the field of comparative and Japanese philosophy in 2014. The core of the organization aims to support and promote in European languages the scholarship of what is broadly construed as Japanese philosophy. The ENOJP aims to achieve this goal by organizing conferences, initiating research projects, and publishing original thematic essays and translation articles through its peer-reviewed journal, the *European Journal of Japanese Philosophy* (*EJJP*).

The **Third ENOJP Conference** will take place on **November 2–4, 2017** at the **Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales (INALCO)** and **Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne** in Paris (France). This conference aims to provide scholars in the field of comparative and Japanese philosophy with a platform for sharing their research projects and also to help them build a wider community for their work across Europe and beyond. The event marks the first conference on comparative and Japanese philosophy both at INALCO and PARIS 1, and will feature three keynote addresses, two workshops on Ōmori Shōzō and Comparative Philosophy, and 17 panels with 54 presenters from across the world. For more information, visit us at <https://enojp.org/conferences/>.

Jan Gerrit STRALA, *ENOJP, President*
 Laurentiu ANDREI, *Philosophies et rationalités (UCA)*
 & UFR 10, Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne,
 Conference Coordinator

Conference Program

Thursday, 2 November

8.30–9.00 Registration (INALCO, Foyer [in front of the *Auditorium 1*])

Auditorium 1

9.00–9.30 Welcome and Introduction: Takeshi Morisato (*ENOJP & Université libre de Bruxelles*); President of the Organizing Committee: Takako Saitō; Emeritus Professor of the University of Paris 7: Yvon Brès

Auditorium 1

9.30–11.00 Keynote Address
Chair: Laurentiu Andrei

Michael Lucken, *Le «Japon grec» : réflexion sur l'imagination des cultures*

11:00–11:30 Coffee & Tea Break

11.30–12.30 **PANEL SESSIONS**

Room 3.03

Panel 1: *Philosophy of Nature*

Chair: Felipe Ferrari

- **Kristýna Vojtišková:** Imanishi Kinji on Time and History
- **Roman Paşca:** On Nature and the Universe in the Tokugawa Period: Parables, Fables and Illustrations as

Philosophical Discourse

*Room 3.11***Panel 2: *Self, Other and Individualism***Chair: **Amanda Soyanara Fernandes**

- **Rossa Ó Muireartaigh:** Self or Other, or Other: Exploring the Ideological Tensions in Suzuki and Tanabe through the Concepts of *jrjriki* and *tariki*
- **Jordanco Sekulovski:** In-Between the Isoalted-Self: Watsuji's Critique of Western Individualism

*Room 3.15***Panel 3: *Translation and Philosophy of Language***Chair: **Pierre Bonneels**

- **Juan Ignacio García de las Peñas Otero:** Nishi Amane and Auguste Comte: A Positivism Inheritance
- **Florencia Di Rocco:** Étymologie, histoire et grammaire de la couleur au Japon : Kitahara à l'épreuve de Wittgenstein

12.30–14.30 Lunch

14.30–16.00 **PANEL SESSIONS***Room 3.03***Panel 4: *Nishida and Comparative Philosophy***Chair: **Felipe Ferrari**

- **Leon Krings:** Nishida's Theory of Embodiment: The Historical Body and Self-Cultivation
- **Montserrat Crespín:** Sketches about Japanese Philosophy of Law: Transplants, Rejections and Convergences

- **Francesca Greco:** The Possibility of Spatial Origins: A Cross-Cultural Approach to the Platonic $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$

Room 3.11

Panel 5: *Pathways in Nishitani's Philosophy*

Chair: **Rossa Ó Muireartaigh**

- **Carlos Barbosa:** Mind as Relation: What Can Cognitive Science Learn from Nishitani's Philosophy?
- **Kyle Shuttleworth:** Alienation and Authenticity within Contemporary Japanese Society
- **Amanda Sayonara Fernandes Prazeres:** Nothingness and freedom: A comparative analysis between Nishitani Keiji and Meister Eckhart's perspectives

Room 3.15

Panel 6: *Aesthetics and Poetics*

Chair: **Pierre Bonneels**

- **Arthur Mitteau:** Esthétique, religion et laïcité chez Ernest Fenollosa et Okakura Tenshin
- **Masumi Sunaba-Sevrin:** La dialectique et le symbolisme : une lecture de *La Philosophie artistique de Valéry* de Hajime Tanabe
- **Suguru Kawasato:** Le point de vue commun sur l'art de Bergson et Zeami

16:00–16:30 Coffee & Tea Break

16:30–19:15 ŌMORI SHŌZŌ WORKSHOP

AVEC LE SOUTIEN DE L'INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE FRANCE

16:30–18:00 SESSION I

Amphitheatre 4

Chair: **Elie During & Shin Abiko**

- **Tatsuya Higaki:** Ōmori Shōzō's Philosophy of *Kasane-egaki* (Superimposed Description)

- **Pierre Bonneels:** L'empirisme tremblant du langage dans l'œuvre de jeunesse du philosophe japonais Ōmori Shōzō : Comment traduire les concepts logiques d'Ōmori Shōzō en français?
- **Masaki Harada:** *Temps et ego* de troisième personne comme fabrications du langage

17:45–18:00 Coffee & Tea Break

18:00–19:30 SESSION 2

Chair: **Elie During & Shin Abiko**

- **Michel Dalissier:** Le bon sens est-il la chose du monde la mieux partagée? Sens commun et vie ordinaire chez Ōmori Shōzō
- **Akinobu Kuroda:** Où est le cœur? Une dernière philosophie d'Ōmori Shōzō

19:30– Dinner & Reception

* Recent Publications of the ENOJP members will be displayed at the Entrance Hall.

Friday, 3 November

9.00–9.30 Registration (INALCO, Foyer)

Auditorium 1

9.30–11.00 Keynote Address
Chair: **Raquel Bouso**

John C. Maraldo, Reconceptualizing “dignity”
from the perspective of Watsuji Tetsurō

11.00–11.30 Coffee & Tea Break

11.30–12.30 **PANEL SESSIONS**

Room 3.11

Panel 7: *Nishida's Philosophy in Dialogue*

Chair: **Yū Inutsuka**

- **Takako Saitō**: La philosophie kantienne et *La quête du Bien* (1911) de Nishida Kitarō
- **Simitzi G. Sofia**: William James and Nishida Kitarō: On the Edge of Experience in a Global Era

Room 3.15

Panel 8: *Kuki and the Problem of Metaphysics*

Chair: **Pierre Bonneels**

- **Simon Ebersolt**: La rencontre comme phénomène originaire. Kuki Shūzō, phénoménologue de la contingence
- **Kentarō Otagiri**: L'être comme contingent : un essai sur l'être chez Heidegger

12.30–14.30 Lunch

14.30–16.00 PANEL SESSIONS

Room 3.03

Panel 9: *Watsuji and Philosophy of Nature*

Chair: Kyle Shuttleworth

- **David W. Johnson:** *Fūdo* 風土: History, Language, and Philosophy
- **Wawrzyn Warkocki:** Φύσις et 風土: Heidegger, Watsuji et le sens du monde
- **Yū Inutsuka:** Watsuji and Nishida on the Predictability of Nature

Room 3.11

Panel 10: *Pathways in Nishida's Philosophy*

Chair: Leon Krings

- **Jonatan Navarro:** The Relationship of Matter and Idea in Nishida Kitarō's Concept of "Active Intuition"
- **Mika Imono:** Transformation du corps et de la conscience à travers l'apprentissage des *kata* (型)
- **Raphaël Pierres:** *Ego* et *Jiko*. Esquisse pour une étude comparée des formes du problème de l'intériorité

Room 3.15

Panel 11: *Kuki's Contingency in Comparison*

Chair: Carlos Barbosa

- **Kazuaki Oda:** Primary Contingency and Absolute Nothing: Being and Nothing in the Philosophy of Kuki Shūzō and Nishida Kitarō
- **Takashi Okinaga:** "Originary Event" and "Spontaneous Breaking of Symmetry": The Attitudes of Kuki Shūzō and Nanbu Yoichiro toward the Causal Law
- **Hans Peter Liederbach:** Betweenness and Contingency: Watsuji and Kuki on the Logic of Encounter

16.00–16.30 Coffee & Tea Break

16.30–18.00 PANEL SESSIONS

Room 3.03

Panel 12: *Ueda Shizuteru*

Chair: **Raquel Bouso**

- **Yukiko Kuwayama:** Being With and In Language: Understanding Ueda Shizuteru's Concept of *Urwort* (根源語)
- **Adam Loughnane:** Hollowness or Opening: Poetic Language in the Philosophy of Ueda and Heidegger

Room 3.11

Panel 13: *Interreligious Philosophy*

Chair: **Roman Paşca**

- **Eriko Shimamura:** Ignatian Spirituality and Zen Buddhism: An Example of Inculturation and Interreligious dialogues in Japan
- **Naoki Kuwabara:** Pedro Gomez and the Japanese Buddhism in the 16th and the 17th Century
- **Paulus Kaufmann:** Kūkai as Philosopher

Room 3.15

Panel 14: *Intercultural Philosophy*

Chair: **Leon Krings**

- **Niklas Söderman:** Potential for Emancipation?: Kyoto School as Critical Philosophy
- **Ralf Müller:** Japanese Philosophy as Translation: Expanding Hermeneutics for Intercultural Dialogue
- **Lucas dos Reis Martins:** The Indianization of European Philosophies in Japan: 哲学 (*tetsugaku*) as Critical Case

18.00–18.15 Coffee & Tea Break

18.15–19.15 Break & Board Member Meeting
Chair: Takeshi Morisato

19.30 Dinner

Saturday, 4 November

8.45–9.15 Registration (Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne,
Room: *Amphitheatre Bachelard*)

Amphitheatre Bachelard

9.15–9.30 Welcome and Introduction: Laurent Jaffro
(Professor of Moral Philosophy, Paris 1
Panthéon-Sorbonne)

9.30–12.30 COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY WORK-
SHOP

9:30–11:00 SESSION 1

Amphitheatre Bachelard

Chair: **Akinobu Kuroda**

- **André Charrak:** Comparaison et compréhension de soi. Sur les projections de la conscience historique en philosophie
- **Alain Petit:** Philosophie orientale
- **Vincent Citot:** Ce qu'enseigne la comparaison entre les philosophies japonaise, chinoise et européenne du XVIIIe s. sur les rapports de la philosophie à la culture savante

11.00–11.30 Coffee & Tea Break

11:30–12:30 SESSION 2

Chair: **Florenzia Di Rocco**

- **Laurentiu Andrei:** L'approche comparatiste de Nakamura Hajime
- **Samuel Marie:** What is at Stake in the Idea of a Comparative Philosophy?

12.30–14.30 Lunch

14.30–16.00 **PANEL SESSIONS**

Room Cavaillès

Panel 15: *Nishida and the Modernity*

Chair: **Yū Inutsuka**

- **Filip Gurjanov:** Nishida and the Experience of Photographing
- **Alessio Gerola:** Filling Nothingness: Considerations on the Posthuman from Nishida and Plessner
- **Jacynthe Tremblay:** Nishida et la physique quantique: Concomitance et complémentarité

Room Halbwachs

Panel 16: *Contemporary Philosophy of Science, Epistemology and Psychoanalysis*

Chair: **Arnaud Pelletier**

- **Masahiro Morioka:** The Dignity of the Body: A Philosophical Implication of the Japanese Organ Transplant Law Before Amendment
- **Makoto Katsumori:** Hiromatsu on the Valid and the Prevalent

Room Marc Bloch

Panel 17: *Zen and Intercultural Philosophy*

Chair: **Takeshi Morisato**

- **Lorenzo Marinucci:** Understanding Laughter, Laughter as Understanding: Irony and Comic as Thought within Japanese culture
- **Eric S. Nelson:** “Zen Robots” and the “Yellow Menace”: Western Anxieties, Zen Buddhism, and the Problem of Intercultural Interpretation
- **Andrew K. Whitehead:** Zen Person/Zen Revolution: How Classical Japanese Thought Can Help Us Change the World

16.00–16.30 Coffee & Tea Break

Amphitheatre Bachelard

16.30–18.00 **Keynote Address**
Chair: **Pierre Bonneels**

Emmanuel Lozerand, *Le potentiel philosophique
de la langue japonaise*

18.00–18.30 Closing Speech & Announcement

19.30 Dinner

Abstracts

KEYNOTE ADDRESSES

“Le «Japon grec» : réflexion sur l’imagination des cultures”

— Michael Lucken, *INALCO*

L’image du «Japon grec» a joué dans l’Archipel un rôle séminal dans la constitution des champs de la philosophie, de l’architecture et de l’histoire de l’art. Mais elle est problématique pour au moins deux raisons. 1) Le modèle grec a été abondamment instrumentalisé par les puissances coloniales occidentales pour asseoir leur domination. C’est la raison pour laquelle les études postcoloniales (Frantz Fanon, Dipesh Chakrabarty) ont davantage souligné la nécessité d’un rejet de l’héritage classique que sa réinterprétation. 2) Entre 1890 et 1945, la Grèce antique fut largement préemptée par les nationalistes japonais et mise au service de la domination de l’Asie de l’est. À la question coloniale, s’ajoute donc un problème de légitimité culturelle. L’image du «Japon grec» interroge en effet la possibilité même de l’appropriation de la Grèce et de ses attributs (la philosophie, l’idéalisme anthropomorphe, la démocratie) par une culture qui, au départ, ne semble pas partager le même rapport au monde.

Pour essayer de défaire ce nœud, où se mêlent des fils d’ordres éthique et épistémologique, je propose de suivre les étapes de l’«imaginaire» qui a présidé à la constitution de cette «image», depuis sa première manifestation chez des savants occidentaux dans la deuxième moitié du 19^e siècle, jusqu’à son incarnation dans l’œuvre de philosophes du 20^e siècle, de Watsuji Tetsurō à Karatani Kōjin. Ce parcours me conduira à développer une réflexion autour de la question de l’imaginaire national, en dialogue avec des auteurs, comme

Cornelius Castoriadis et Benedict Anderson, qui ont mis en avant le caractère fantasmé des liens qui unissent les individus au sein des collectivités modernes. L'histoire du « Japon grec » montre que l'imagination non seulement ne se déploie pas de façon autonome, mais qu'une tension lui est consubstantielle, qu'elle n'existe que dans une relation complexe à la connaissance et à l'action, qu'elle implique des rapports de force. Pour le dire autrement, je souhaite prendre de la distance vis-à-vis d'une conception autocentrée, idéaliste, voire monothéiste de l'imagination, pour mieux mettre en évidence son caractère relatif et critique.

“Reconceptualizing “dignity” from the perspective of Watsuji Tetsurō”

— John C. Maraldo, *University of North Florida*

The modern concept of dignity underlies declarations of human rights as well as international norms of social behavior. Yet this complex concept makes assumptions about the nature of being human that are both unnoticed and questionable. A comparison and contrast with Watsuji's notion of *ningen* 人間 brings to light the assumption that human beings, as inherently endowed with dignity, are first and foremost individual persons. Although Watsuji makes only a few remarks about *songen* (威厳) or dignity in his Ethics, a critical appropriation of his perspective can offer a corrective to that assumption and perhaps a way to better understand human interactions in other cultures.

Part of the complexity of the widespread notion of dignity is that, since Kant, the word ambiguously refers to both an inherent quality of all human beings and to an elevated status or position (as in “being dignified” or “dignifying someone” by virtue of some contingent quality). Both meanings are related to the notion of respect, but the sense of an equal, inborn quality in each and every human being emphasizes the

autonomy of the individual, in contrast to the sense of respect, which require the presence of others, and in contrast to the relational sense of dignifying or being dignified. Dignity is thought to be each person's own; respect is something people give one another. What happens to dignity, then, when people—human beings—are conceived as inherently relational? This is the question I will pursue in my keynote address.

To appropriate Watsuji's conception of being human (*nin-gen*), however, will require that we correct his own tendency to conceive human beings in hierarchical terms and place increasing value in greater totalities like the nation-state. It will also require an alternative sense of autonomy that is relational and seemingly in conflict with current notions of *songen* in Japanese social practices, such as the care of the elderly and the dying. And it will have consequences for negative approaches to understanding dignity, that is, for clarifying its meaning by examining its violation and the circumstances of treating others inhumanly. In short—to extrapolate from Watsuji—I think we can say that dignity is a gift we give—or refuse to give—to each other.

“Le potentiel philosophique de la langue japonaise”

— Emmanuel Lozerand, *INALCO*

Bien qu'il existe une production philosophique importante en langue japonaise, on a trop souvent prêté l'oreille à des discours (Heidegger, Barthes, Berque) qui s'intéressaient au potentiel non-philosophique, voire antiphilosophique de celle-ci, sans prendre le temps d'examiner posément les ressources linguistiques qui permettent aux penseurs japonais de s'exprimer dans leur langue.

On voudrait ici revenir sur quelques arguments avancés par les tenants d'une irréductible étrangeté de l'idiome japonais pour mieux mettre en valeur, dans un second temps, quelques aspects du potentiel conceptuel et logique d'une langue que

seuls l'ignorance et les préjugés veulent maintenir dans un statut d'extraterritorialité philosophique.

ŌMORI SHŌZŌ WORKSHOP

“Ōmori Shōzō : un « zénith » de la philosophie analytique au Japon”

Entouré de ses collègues, amis et étudiants, en plus de son dévouement à l'introduction de la philosophie analytique au Japon, Ōmori Shōzō (1921-1997) a, nous le croyons, inauguré une philosophie très japonaise. La preuve en est peut-être que la plupart des concepts clés de sa philosophie semblent quasi intraduisibles en langues occidentales (*kotodama*, *kasane-egaki*, *tachi-araware*, *omoi-sonzai*, *katari-sonzai*, *ima-saichu*). Ce serait également là une des raisons pour lesquelles Ōmori Shōzō n'a, pour ainsi dire, jamais été présenté à l'étranger et notamment en Europe (une trentaine des pages lui sont consacrées dans *Philosophie japonaise – le néant, le monde et le corps*, 2013, Vrin, font exception). Et pourtant, de notre point de vue, il est un des philosophes japonais tout aussi original et importants que Nishida et Tanabe. Afin donc de lui rendre justice et pour introduire cette philosophie complexe, concrètement pour la première fois en Europe, nous partirons du concept « *kasane-egaki* » que l'on peut tenter de traduire par « description superposée ». Car il nous semble que ce concept, clé de la philosophie Ōmoricienne, l'écarte à jamais de n'importe quel dualisme et de n'importe quel réductionnisme tout en installant sa pensée dans un phénoménisme non réductionniste radical. Après avoir montré, dans son sens large, la portée théorique de ce concept, notre Workshop examinera plusieurs des applications plus ou moins directes liées aux problèmes philosophiques qui concernent les relations entre « nécessité » et « expérience », « temps scientifique » et « temps de la vie quotidienne », « soi » et « autre » et finale-

ment « sujet » et « objet ».

“Ōmori Shōzō’s Philosophy of *Kasane-egaki* (Superimposed Description)”

— Tatsuya Higaki, *Osaka University*

In this presentation I want to introduce Ōmori’s philosophy following the periodisation of his works, focusing on how his theory of *kasane-egaki* (superimposed description)—a kind of phenomenological monism—was formed and what its significance is.

Ōmori started his career as a physicist and philosopher of science in the United States. In the middle period of his life, when he was teaching philosophy of science at the University of Tokyo College of Arts and Sciences, he tuned to the problem of *mono* (things) and *koto* (what happens), *mono* (things) and *kokoro* (mind), and tried to solve this problem. According to his theory, everything appears in itself, and these are superimposed as a single (solipsistic) phenomenon that contains differences. After retiring from the university, he continues to present many ideas, such as that “time does not flow,” and that “the brain is not necessary.” However, his most powerful idea is without doubt the theory of *kasane-egaki*; I will therefore attempt to throw light on it from the standpoint of the development of his thought.

“L’empirisme tremblant du langage dans l’œuvre de jeunesse du philosophe japonais Ōmori Shōzō : Comment traduire les concepts logiques d’Ōmori Shōzō en français ?”

— Pierre Bonneels, *Université libre de Bruxelles*

Le but de cette communication est d’abord de présenter la logique et la philosophie telles que le philosophe japonais Ōmori Shōzō la conçoit. Deuxièmement, nous nous attellerons à la tâche d’ordonner cette vision et par là dégager les points importants qui constituent sa pensée de jeunesse.

Ōmori Shōzō est empiriste et pour lui le défi est d’expli-

quer qu'en référence avec la nécessité des phrases logiquement vraies, cette nécessité doit être fondée sur l'expérience.

Pour nous préparer à ce problème, nous allons décrire des observations banales au sujet du mot 論理学 (*ronrigaku* – trad. logique, science de la logique). Car il s'agit bien de nous situer dans le langage vernaculaire qui accueille la pensée d'Ōmori, le japonais. Dans ces limites nous pouvons dégager deux concepts celui de 論理 (*ronri* – trad. logique) et de 学 (*gaku* – trad. science). Comme l'idéogramme 学 signifie le fait de faire une étude, nous pouvons comprendre que les termes de 論理学 font référence à l'étude de la logique. Cette dernière différenciation est au regard de la pensée Ōmoricienne extrêmement importante. C'est à partir de cette séparation que nous aborderons la philosophie de la logique telle que présentée par Ōmori. Fort de cette analyse nous parlerons donc § 1 du sens de la logique pour voir ensuite § 2 son sens compris en tant que science. Dans une troisième partie, à partir de la logique comprise en tant que science nous discuterons § 3 la provenance de la nécessité que comportent en elles les phrases logiques.

“*Temps et ego de troisième personne comme fabrications du langage*”

— Masaki Harada, *Seisen Université*

Dans ses derniers ouvrages des années quatre-vingt-dix, Ōmori Shōzō réfléchit sur les problèmes du temps, de l'alter ego et du corps-esprit. Ōmori refuse non seulement le dualisme du temps scientifique et du temps dans la vie quotidienne, celui du moi de la première personne et du moi de la troisième personne, et celui du corps et de l'esprit, mais aussi le monisme, qui dérive l'un de l'autre, ou qui pose une réalité derrière ceux qui apparaissent d'une manière variée. À la place, Ōmori prend une position constructiviste. Est-ce que cela signifie que les concepts, tels que le temps et l'ego de la troisième personne sont construits par la conscience, comme

la phénoménologie husserlienne l'affirme? Ōmori le refuse. La conscience, pour lui, est une illusion par l'esprit trop analytique. Alors, par quoi sont-ils construits? Selon Ōmori, ils procèdent des fabrications du langage : le langage holistique mis dans le contexte de la totalité de la vie humaine.

“Le bon sens est-il la chose du monde la mieux partagée?
Sens commun et vie ordinaire chez Ōmori Shōzō”

— Michel Dalissier, *Kanazawa Université*

We have so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be the prey to errors and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining (Hume)

Descartes soutenait comme on sait que «le bon sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagée». Or, sur ce point, le philosophe japonais Ōmori Shōzō apparaît pour le moins partagé. En effet, se demande-t-il : le sens commun est-il le bon sens et un bon sens, tout particulièrement lorsqu'il nous renseigne sur la nature du temps? Qu'est-ce qui est exactement «commun» dans le sens commun? Et en quel sens est-ce un «sens» ?

Dans cette intervention, je me concentrerai sur l'ouvrage d'Ōmori Temps et Soi (1992) afin de discuter la distinction qu'il introduit entre le sens commun contemporain et l'expérience de la vie ordinaire. Je tenterai de montrer qu'une telle distinction nous offre une clé originale pour pénétrer au sein de sa pensée iconoclaste, méditer les paradoxes de la relation entre le soi et l'autre et reconsidérer sa fameuse thèse : «Le temps ne s'écoule pas.»

“Où est le cœur? Une dernière philosophie d'Ōmori Shōzō”

— Akinobu Kuroda, *Université de Strasbourg*

En critiquant la «mauvaise habitude» de ce que nous appelons «pensée moderne», qui ne peut s'empêcher de s'ap-

propre tout ce qui est relatif aux sentiments en les mettant « dans le cœur », Ōmori met en avant l'idée de monisme de l'univers émotionnel — le monde émotionnel vécu en-deçà du schéma dualiste sujet / objet, dans son dernier écrit, publié quelques mois avant sa mort.

En réalité, le monde lui-même est déjà affectif. C'est le monde qui est affectif, c'est le monde lui-même qui sera un monde joyeux ou triste. Ce dont on est persuadé, à savoir que le sentiment est un sentiment se trouvant dans son cœur, ne constitue en fait qu'un tout petit premier plan du sentiment de ce monde entier. Cela, nous pourrions le comprendre, si nous pensons à la météo et aux sentiments liés à celle-ci. Le monde sombre dans la saison des pluies, où les nuages assombrissent lourdement le ciel, est lugubre en soi, de sorte que moi, comme étant un élément constitutif de ce paysage, je tombe aussi dans un état lugubre. Quant au monde automnal où le ciel haut est entièrement dégagé, il est lui-même sublime, solennel et splendide, si bien que moi, en tant qu'élément constitutif du premier plan de ce monde, je me sens moi aussi sublime, solennel et splendide.

Bref, le monde est affectif, le Ciel et la Terre ont eux-mêmes des sentiments et des émotions. Nous autres êtres humains, dans la continuité effective avec le Ciel et la Terre, participons également à ces sentiments et à ces émotions en tant que minuscule premier plan du Ciel et de la Terre. (「自分と出会う—意識こそ人と世界を隔てる元凶」[Rencontre avec soi-même – la conscience, la première cause séparant l'être humain et le monde.] In『大森莊蔵セレクション』 [Sélection d'Ōmori Shōzō], Heibonsha, « Heibonsha raiburarii », 2011, p. 453-454. Publication initiale dans le journal Asahi le 12 novembre 1996.)

Nous nous proposons de présenter un commentaire de ce texte afin d'en dégager un enjeu philosophique qui est toujours actuel.

COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY WORKSHOP

Session I

“Comparaison et compréhension de soi. Sur les projections de la conscience historique en philosophie”

— André Charrak, *Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne*

En s’attachant à certains aspects de la diffusion de la modernité philosophique (c’est-à-dire, également, scientifique) occidentale, on essaiera de repérer, d’une part, les conséquences de ce processus sur la compréhension que chaque tradition a d’elle-même et, d’autre part, la sorte d’aveuglement sur soi que dénoncent, en Europe, les premiers essais de comparaison entre les philosophies. On souhaite ainsi montrer que, dans les limites et les malentendus mêmes qu’elles charrient, ces tentatives imposent à l’historien de la philosophie de réfléchir sur ce qui constitue une culture philosophique.

“Philosophie orientale”

— Alain Petit, *Université Clermont-Auvergne*

On se propose de présenter cursivement une généalogie du concept de philosophie « orientale » en s’interrogeant sur les différents types de comparatisme auxquels il a pu être associé. Contrairement à ce que laisserait attendre l’adjectif « oriental », le comparatisme tout d’abord mis en œuvre, dans les entreprises des Jésuites au Japon puis en Chine, n’est pas différentialiste, même s’il se présente à certains égards comme contrastif.

Une commune raison unit Orient et Occident, lors même que les langues, les coutumes, les déterminations culturelles manifestent un écart qui peut aller jusqu’ à en faire des antipodes. Ce paradigme comparatiste n’est pas pour autant assimilationniste. Il sera un héritage dormant des disciplines orientalistes au moment présumé de leur laïcisation. Mais l’

«orientalisation» de la philosophie va s'accompagner de l'émergence d'un comparatisme «exoticisant», qui va confiner l'exercice de la pensée dans des limites frôlant la dissonance cognitive structurelle.

Quelle consistance donner au concept de «philosophie orientale»? N'est-elle sortie d'un universalisme à fondement théologique que pour sombrer dans l'abîme xénologique? On tentera de lui faire un sort en revenant de façon critique sur les critères peu sûrs de l'orientalité et sur les buts possibles de la philosophie comparée.

“Ce qu'enseigne la comparaison entre les philosophies japonaise, chinoise et européenne du XVIIIe s. sur les rapports de la philosophie à la culture savante”

— Vincent Citot, *Université Paris-Sorbonne*

Je propose de montrer que le XVIIIe siècle correspond à une période exceptionnelle dans les histoires des philosophies européenne, chinoise et japonaise. En effet, c'est à cette époque que la philosophie prend un recul inédit par rapport à la tradition religieuse des siècles précédents, au point qu'émerge une nouvelle classe de libres penseurs; qu'elle se tourne vers l'étude de la nature et de la société en adoptant un état d'esprit positif; et, enfin, qu'elle contribue à l'émergence d'un nouveau type de savoir sur l'homme, qui prendra peu après la forme des «sciences humaines». Aussi bien en Europe qu'en Chine et au Japon, les grands penseurs du XVIIIe siècle sont identiquement philosophes et savants – à tout le moins précurseurs du discours savant en histoire, linguistique, philologie, économie, et, pour certains, en sociologie, psychologie et anthropologie. Nous pouvons citer Montesquieu, Hume, Diderot et Smith pour l'Europe; Gu Yanwu, Wang Fuzhi, Dai Zhen et Ji Yun pour la Chine (où nous faisons commencer cette période d'exception dès le milieu du XVIIe siècle); et Arai Hakuseki, Dazai Shundai, Tominaga Nakamoto, Miura Baien et Yamaga-

ta Bantô pour le Japon – Ogyû Sorai et Motoori Norinaga devant, selon nous, être traités à part en raison de leur traditionalisme. S’agissant du Japon en particulier, ce XVIII^e siècle correspond à l’apparition de philosophies originales qui s’affranchissent partiellement de la domination intellectuelle du néoconfucianisme sinisant du siècle précédent, et qui ne sont pas encore sous la tutelle intellectuelle de l’Occident – quoique les auteurs se passionnent pour les sciences occidentales.

A partir du XIX^e siècle, la vie intellectuelle se scinde en deux ; les philosophes sont alors rarement des savants, et inversement. Cette tendance séculaire est marquée dans les trois cultures que nous prenons en considération – avec une exception pour le Japon du début de l’ère Meiji (1862-1889), où nous trouvons des penseurs de la trempe de Fukuzawa Yuki-chi. Le cloisonnement disciplinaire et l’institutionnalisation des disciplines donnent à la production philosophique une coloration qui l’éloigne irrémédiablement du XVIII^e siècle. Il conviendra, bien entendu, de ne pas minimiser les différences profondes entre les pôles culturels et intellectuels européen, chinois et japonais. Ces différences sont certes une limite au comparatisme, mais elles ne sauraient invalider la démarche comparatiste en tant que telle, puisque c’est elle qui rend justement possible la mise en évidence de différences.

Session II

“L’approche comparatiste de Nakamura Hajime”

— Laurentiu Andrei, *Philosophies et rationalités (UCA)*

‣ UFR 10, Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Nombre de travaux de Nakamura Hajime (中村元) relèvent d’une approche que l’on peut assimiler à celle d’un historien des idées. Cette approche a néanmoins ceci de particulier qu’elle ne consiste pas à considérer les cultures de manière séparée, mais au contraire à les comparer systématiquement à partir

de problèmes philosophiques-clés. Il entend par là des problèmes qui relèvent de concepts philosophiques et religieux tels que la divinité, l'absolu, l'immortalité, les universaux, les valeurs morales, etc. Nakamura considère que ces problèmes philosophiques-clés, qui surgissent au sein d'une culture donnée et avec lesquels celle-ci se confronte, ne sont pas fondamentalement différents de ceux d'une autre culture, malgré des différences d'ordre linguistique et historique intrinsèques. Au fond, la présence ou l'absence de concepts similaires n'empêche pas sur l'existence de ces problèmes philosophiques communs. À partir de leur identification, de leur description et de leur analyse, le comparatiste japonais cherche à montrer que leur apparition et leur développement ont eu lieu de manière quasi-parallèle, dans des zones culturelles différentes et notamment en Orient et en Occident, tout en dénonçant cette dichotomie comme trop simplificatrice. En même temps, il estime que, dans la mesure où leur ordre d'apparition et leur développement reflètent les transformations des sociétés humaines historiquement observables, ces problèmes philosophiques-clés caractérisent toutes les cultures. Ce qui ne veut nullement dire que leur apparition soit absolument simultanée dans les différentes cultures, ni que leur formulation et la manière de les aborder soient indépendantes des spécificités culturelles.

En somme, l'approche comparative de Nakamura opère un parallélisme délibéré entre des idées provenant principalement d'Inde, de Chine, du Japon et d'Europe. À partir de ce qu'il appelle des faits historiques observables, il parvient ainsi à tracer un ordre commun d'apparition, un schéma de développement de problèmes philosophiques-clés, tout en mettant en évidence leurs similitudes et leurs différences. La finalité avouée de cette approche est celle de frayer le chemin à une histoire de la philosophie mondiale permettant de mieux saisir l'humanité commune qui nous caractérise par-delà les différences culturelles : une ambition résolument cosmopoli-

tique. Si cette ambition demeure en elle-même louable, les moyens par lesquels Nakamura entend la poursuivre peuvent soulever un certain nombre d'interrogations. On peut se demander, par exemple, si le choix qu'il opère à l'égard des textes, des idées et des problèmes discutés est véritablement représentatif d'une culture donnée. Telle où telle source textuelle pourrait en effet ne refléter que la position de son ou ses auteurs à un moment historique donné. De surcroît, comment être sûr que ce choix répond au critère de l'objectivité et qu'il ne cherche pas seulement à satisfaire le développement parallèle des idées envisagé par le comparatiste ?

À travers une analyse de son approche, il s'agit de se demander si le comparatisme de Nakamura peut échapper à la généralisation et dans quelle mesure il peut constituer un paradigme méthodologique pour le dialogue philosophique interculturel.

“What is at Stake in the Idea of a Comparative Philosophy?”

— Samuel Marie, *Université Jean-Moulin Lyon 3*

A comparative philosophy project implies some assumptions which are far from obvious. It implies, for instance, that we could draw a clear line between traditions of thought presented as monolithic and radically foreign one to another. It raises many other problems of the same nature. For instance, what does the adjective “Japanese” means in the expression “Japanese Philosophy,” or “Western” in “Western Philosophy”? Such an approach exposes itself to the risk of carry within it some form of essentialism insofar as one can be tempted to identify irreducibly Japanese or Western features in either tradition in order to be able to compare them from outside. This approach is not self-evident. Indeed, the claim that we can be able to compare these philosophical traditions implies that these thoughts can be translated, without loss of meaning, from one theoretical language to another. This

therefore presupposes a form of commensurability between the compared thoughts and raises questions regarding their so-called radical otherness.

Generally speaking, the possibility of a comparative philosophy brings with it the question of the universality of Philosophy. The problem could be summarized as follows: if there is a plurality of incommensurable philosophies, each one being only the expression of one culture in particular, does one not risk reducing the philosophy to a mere contingent cultural fact? If traditions of thought are irreducibly incommensurable how could a dialogue between them be even possible? Doesn't dialogue presupposes common objects, or common questions, about which we could discuss?

Shouldn't we rather conceive philosophy as a universal project to which philosophers from all horizons would contribute? Moreover, instead of decreeing that the Western philosophy is universal as such, shouldn't we rather say that philosophy, by opening itself to thinkers from different traditions and historical trajectories, is fated to becoming a Universal entity, in a process of universalization?

Our main goal will be to examine the very idea of a comparative philosophy and to point out the difficulties and limitations of such an undertaking.

PANEL PRESENTATIONS

Panel 1: *Philosophy of Nature*

“Imanishi Kinji on Time and History”

— Kristýna Vojtišková, *Charles University*

Imanishi Kinji's (1902–1992) shizengaku, developed in his major work *Seibutsu no sekai* (*The World of Living Things*, 1941) and predominantly influenced by Nishida Kitarō's Zen philosophy, environmental sciences, and sociology, proposes a teleological, anthropomorphic interpretation of the liv-

ing world. Imanishi's world of living things is a holistic system based on an undivided continuity of individual-nature non-dualism in which every organism and species originated from one thing. His theory, strongly opposing Darwin's theory of natural selection, assumes that the world is not chaotic or random, despite the fact that it is ceaselessly changing. In such a spatio-temporal world, both structure and function are manifested in every single organism. As every living thing has its bodily existence in this spatio-temporal structure, it is continuously in a state of gradual decay eventually resulting in death. Therefore, from the perspective of an individual organism, time appears to be "an enemy" which the entity tries to overcome by means of maintaining itself in its present state of structure and function, i.e. body and life.

The world of living things does not consist only of individuals, however. Imanishi views it as a community or society of organisms, a sociological unit which is characterized as teleologically oriented towards self-completeness in wholeness. This is what he calls species. Species develop, therefore we perceive evolution. Evolution inevitably happens in space-time. Although we might contend that the temporal structure of the world again "opposes" evolution by limiting individuals' lives, for species, time limits an indefinite continuation of species. Once a species approaches closer to the summit of development, it begins to self-destruct and another one replaces it. Such a mechanism is noticeable in evolution from the beginning. At this point Imanishi starts a discussion on history. Imanishi views the history of the world as the history of evolution, which is, in essence, the history of the rise and fall of leading species, i.e. the ruling class.

My paper analyzes temporal factors within Imanishi's theory of evolution related to various subjects in order to consider time and history from the perspective of biology.

“On Nature and the Universe in the Tokugawa Period:
Parables, Fables and Illustrations as Philosophical
Discourse”

— Roman Paşca, *Kanda University of International
Studies*

In his *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique* (first published in 1981), French philosopher Pierre Hadot argues that, ever since the ancient times, philosophers have constantly made use of several other modes of discourse and practices beside rational argumentation. Thus, he identifies the dialectical, the exegetical, and the systematic as the most prominent forms of discourse, and suggests that philosophy should not be understood merely as a dry practice focusing on rational argumentation, but rather as a way of life. As Maraldo (2013) and Smith (2016) propose, in doing so Hadot actually opens up the scope of “philosophy” to accommodate non-Western traditions such as Confucianism, Buddhism or Daoism as well.

If Hadot’s proposition is correct, then how do these modes of discourse appear, for example, in Japanese philosophy? How do they function and what is their role?

To try and answer these questions, I examine the works of Tokugawa philosophers Andō Shōeki 安藤昌益 (1703–62) and Yamagata Bantō 山片蟠桃 (1748–1821). In *Shizen shin’eidō*, while systematically exposing his vision of the world in which *shizen no yo* (“the world of Nature”) represents a primordial, pristine realm, Shōeki also inserts several parables and fables of Daoist inspiration which appear as an anomaly at first sight, as they represent a stylistic and discursive incongruity. On the other hand, Bantō, in his *Yume no shiro*, makes rather extensive use of various illustrations, drawings and diagrams in order to explain his views on cosmology, astronomy, and the place of the Earth in the solar system.

In my presentation, I focus on Shōeki’s vision of Nature and on Bantō’s view of the universe, while discussing their

use of parables and illustrations in an attempt to identify the way in which they construct and structure their discourses. I propose that these apparent “incongruities” (parables, fables, illustrations, diagrams etc.) are by no means mere appendices to, or digressions from the main body of text, but they constitute in fact an integral part of the philosophical discourse. In this sense, they can be viewed as examples of the modes of discourse and practices that Hadot includes in the dialectical.

Hadot, P. 1981. *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*. Paris: Études augustinienes.

Maraldo, John. 2013. “Japanese Philosophy as a Lens on Greco-European Thought,” *Journal of Japanese Philosophy*, Volume 1, pp. 21–56.

Smith, J. 2016. *The Philosopher: A History in Six Types*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Panel 2: *Self, Other and Individualism*

“Self or Other, or Other: Exploring the Ideological Tensions in Suzuki and Tanabe through the Concepts of *jiriki* and *tariki*”

— Rossa Ó Muireartaigh, *Aichi Prefectural University*

The concepts of *jiriki* and *tariki* within Japanese Buddhism express two diametrically opposed views of religious action. *Jiriki* embraces the idea that it is one’s own will and actions that guide religious belief and salvation. *Tariki* argues the opposite, that it is thanks to the actions of another, an entity of higher spiritual power, that one enjoys the salvation of the Dharma. Zen has tended to emphasize *jiriki* while Jodoshinshu has espoused *tariki*.

The conflict between these two concepts can be discerned in Christianity too in Luther’s promotion of the concept of grace, suggesting that the *jiriki/tariki* tension is archetypal

to any religious discourse that concerns itself with the nature and goals of human behavior in a spiritually purposeful and guided universe. But the tensions between the two concepts also mirror a more modern concern between freewill and determinism.

D.T. Suzuki, over the course of his career, was a promoter and apologist for both Zen and Jodoshinshu. As such, he could not avoid referencing the *jiriki* and *tariki* tension. His solution was to engage in a circular dialectic where both concepts were explained away as expressions of each other. However, the simple solution masks Suzuki's own curious foray into the depths of *tariki* belief with his work on the Myokonin and "Japanese Spirituality." Here Suzuki tackled the concept with conclusions that are still controversial with their totalizing vision of cultural and national expression devoid of volition, but which are also highly modern in their seemingly secularized contextualization of religious beliefs and practices.

Equally engaging is Tanabe Hajime's exploration of *tariki* themes and how it resonates with his subtle but determined philosophical conflicts with Nishida Kitarō.

In this presentation, I wish to discuss the conceptual fissures between *jiriki* and *tariki* that Suzuki and Tanabe confronted and engaged with. I want to explore how these fissures spurred them into deeper ponderings on the nature of human will and religious meaning in the world.

"In-Between the Isoalted-Self: Watsuji's Critique of Western Individualism"

— Jordanco Sekulovski, *Temple University Japan*

This presentation explores Watsuji's Rinrigaku as a form of ethics in the study of *Ningen* (Human being) and analyzes Watsuji's model of critique of western individualism and ethics based on the actions and decisions relating to subjective consciousness. Watsuji finds the individualistic conception of

a human being to be a fundamental part of the modern world. In his view, the western culture and its individualist approach consider the individual at the center of all modes of existence which it then substitutes for the totality of human existence (the totality of *ningen*). According to Watsuji this view of the world through the lenses of an isolated ego is the starting point of modern western philosophy.

Watsuji postulates that the locus of all ethical problems lies not in the consciousness of the isolated individual, but precisely in the in-betweenness (*aidagara*) between person and person. From there he builds his argument that ethics is the study of *ningen*, where precisely this in-betweenness among individuals is what allows us to rethink the concept of ethics and move away from the individual centered ethics that runs deep in the philosophical traditions of the West. Ethical problems cannot solely be taken at their source by relying on the individual experience and contemplative efforts, but in the in-betweenness of person and person, therefore ethics cannot be regarded as a discipline that solely defines regulative principles and clarifies moral responsibilities among fellow human beings but should be regarded as a study of Man (*ningen*) going beyond the simple judgement of his moral actions or agency.

The perception of an isolated ego as a starting point of modern thought where the emphasis is put on the role of human beings as contemplating subjects represents a departure from what Watsuji refers to as a concrete human existence. Watsuji, claims that ethics cannot be solely a matter of individual consciousness alone but rather something of a more relational and interdependent nature. Therefore it is important to stress the importance of the notion of *aidagara* as the locus of ethical problems in Watsuji's ethics which lies not in the consciousness of the isolated individual, but precisely in the in-betweenness of person and person. Finally, we will assess Watsuji's analysis of the notion of *rin* or *kâta* (form)—*rin* as in *kimari* or *kata*, or simply order among human beings. This

presentation tries to explore the relationship between these notions and their modern-day relevance.

Panel 3: *Translation and Philosophy of Language*

“Nishi Amane and Auguste Comte:

A Positivism Inheritances”

— Juan Ignacio García de las Peñas Otero

This presentation aims show how Nishi Amane was one of the most important philosophers during the Meiji Restoration. First, his positivist background was indispensable for the development of his philosophical and political thought; and second, as a member of Meiroku, he played a significant role for promoting and westernizing Japan in the field of philosophy.

Since *bakufu* sen scholars to Europe, a process of modernizign took place across Japan. One of the most important philosophers, in this phase of the history, was Nishi Amane (1829–1987) whom we now know as the father of “Western philosophy” in Japan. He had translated a number of wesern philosophical terms into Japanese but most imporatnly the term “philosophy” into “*tetsugaku*” as he tried to remain faithful to its Greek origin. Although his study abroad was mainly in Holland, particularly in Leiden, Nishi preferred to focus on the readings of what was fashionable in Europe, Auguste Comte, while leaving the Dutch language behind in favor of French and English. During his education in Europe, he could have attended at a series of lectures on Comte’s theories and I believe that it has led to the birth of “The Course of Positive Philosophy” (1830–1842), as well as the “Theory of the Tree Treasures of Life” (“*Jinsei Samposetsu*”) (1875), in the *Meiroku Journal* (明六雜誌).

There are two works that reflect the influences of positivism in Nishi’s thinking: *Hyakugaku Renkan* and *Jimsei Semposetsu*. The first is known as “Encyclopedia” due to its classi-

fiction of various scholarly disciplines. The second is an essay that explains the traditional moral education in Japan and criticizes some point of view pertaining to Confucianism and develop the “Theory of Tree Treasures.” In this work, Nishi combines his organization of sciences, society and politics and thereby enumerated health, knowledge, and wealth as the perfect objectives that the government must promote to the citizens.

By analyzing these key texts and their theories that has its source in the 18th century European philosophy, this presentation will argue that Nishi was one of the most important intellectuals who was capable of westernizing and modernizing Japan.

“Étymologie, histoire et grammaire de la couleur au Japon :

Kitahara à l'épreuve de Wittgenstein”

— Florencia Di Rocco, *Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne*

Dans le chapitre éponyme de 青葉は青いか [Aobawa aoika], Yasuo Kitahara aborde le problème déjà “célèbre” de l’instabilité du partage entre 青い [aoi] et 緑 [midori]. En tentant de faire la genèse de ces deux “concepts” dans la langue japonaise, sa réponse emprunte des éléments si bien à une “étymologie” douteuse des termes qu’à une étude de leurs occurrences dans des textes “classiques” (le 日葡辞書 [Nippo Jisho] de 1603, le 万葉集 [Man-yōshū], de 760). Ce problème linguistique “local” pointe un autre, philosophique, plus “général” : Kitahara y suggère plus qu’il ne thématise le caractère “anachronique” de la catégorie “logique” de couleur avant l’ère Meiji ou bien plutôt le monopole, dans les jeux de langage d’antan, de la “luminosité” (明度 [meido] ; litt., “degrés de lumière”) comme trait caractérisant la surface “visible” des objets. Nous évaluerons si sa réponse, sorte de variation du répertoire “philosophique” japonais autour de la couleur (la “phénoménologie” de Nishida mais, avant tout, l’“esthétique” de Tanizaki), est compatible

avec la grammaire ordinaire de la “lumière” et de la “couleur.” Pour ce faire, nous compléterons sa “cartographie” de la couleur avec des exemples du japonais ordinaire et non plus littéraire, tirés des documents trouvés sur place et couvrant la période entre 1630 et le contexte d’après-guerre, que nous analyserons à travers les réflexions de Wittgenstein dans ses *Bemerkungen über die Farben*. D’un point de vue plus “général”, et pour conclure, nous tenterons d’évaluer s’il y a des éléments proprement “logiques” nous permettant de défendre l’idée d’une spécificité de la “grammaire japonaise” de la couleur.

Panel 4: *Nishida and Comparative Philosophy*

“Nishida’s Theory of Embodiment:

The Historical Body and Self-Cultivation”

— Leon Krings, *University of Hildesheim*

In his writings of the 1930s and onwards, Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945) concretizes his abstract “logic of place” by interpreting the “historical world” as the comprehensive basho (place or field) of self-formation in which material as well as spiritual processes of mutual determination between conscious beings and things unfold. At the same time, he pluralizes this concept by distinguishing different worlds and trying to think the interplay between their contrariety and interconnectedness as a “continuity of discontinuity” in which each world functions as a “absolute contradictory self-identity.” As a part of this integration of his logic into historical, spatio-temporal relations, the body becomes a central theme in Nishida’s writings, leading to a theory of embodiment grounded on the notions of “historical body” (*rekishitekishintai*) and “active intuition” (*kōiteki chokkan*). Nishida’s approach to the body is based on his broad intercultural acquaintance with different theories from Europe, the US and East Asia. Additionally, he draws from a wide range of disciplines like physics, biology,

art and religion and anticipates central insights of current debates on “embodiment,” “embedded cognition,” “extended mind” and “enactivism.” In this way, Nishida’s concept of embodiment is a promising discursive field to create fruitful entanglements between approaches from various cultural and disciplinary backgrounds and to develop new theories and practices of embodiment.

In an attempt to further develop Nishida’s theory of embodiment, my method is threefold: First, I want to start from Nishida’s abstract logic of “absolute contradictory self-identity” to show how he uses this framework to think embodied practice as a way of transformation of self and world. Secondly, I want to compare Nishida’s thoughts on embodiment with those of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humberto Maturana, Gilles Deleuze and thinkers from the field of “extended mind” and “enactivism” to connect Nishida’s theory to a broader context of philosophical inquiry and at the same time show differences between his approach and others, locating his standpoint in the broader discourse. Thirdly, I would like to use this comparative analysis to think about the pros and cons of Nishida’s approach and to give a short outlook on possible refinements and further concretizations, drawing on phenomenological considerations especially in connection to my current research on embodiment in Japanese practices of self-cultivation (*michi* or *dō*).

“Sketches about Japanese Philosophy of Law: Transplants,
Rejections and Convergences”

— Montserrat Crespín, *University of Barcelona*

In 1974, the legal scholar Alan Watson (1933–) defined “legal transplants” as the moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another. The concept, agreements and disagreements, opens the discussion about comparative law, and the implications regarding Japanese philosophy of law. And,

consequently, it is an open window to discuss cross-cultural and comparative approaches in this area of the philosophical studies where theory and practice are mutually meaningful.

The objective of this proposal consists, first, to call the attention about legal philosophy in Japan, one of the not sufficiently studied topics within current scholar focuses about history and present of Japanese philosophy. Secondly, introducing and discussing concrete examples, as Nishida's fragments that inform about his views about the philosophy of law or some of the ideas of Tanaka Kōtarō (1890–1974) about nature law, to explore the horizons and limitations of the adjacent debates that fall between formal and cultural perspectives about law, legal systems, and society. That is, how the very idea of right or rule is adopted, interpreted or criticized when we take into consideration correlations and/or asymmetries between different societies and their respective systems of law.

“The Possibility of Spatial Origins: A Cross-Cultural Approach to the Platonic $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$ ”

— Francesca Greco, *University of Heidelberg*

The aim of my proposal is to display how the chōratical myth of creation supports an understanding of the concept of “origin” that distinguishes it from a distant moment in time, from when something began. Through a cross-cultural approach, I intend to underline the spatial and relational character of the emergence of things. Returning to the confrontation and to the different answers given from Nishida and Derrida to the question of the Platonic $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$, I propose a phenomenological re-conceptualization of the notion of the origin in the context of an encounter between Japanese and traditional European philosophy.

In order to free the dawning of things from the irreversible authority of time we need to move to a conception of spatiality that does not conceive of itself as counter-posed to, de-

pendent on or even derived from time. Since $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$ serves as a third category (Tim. 48e) between ideas and sensibility, any temporal-spatial interpretation of the concept tends to lead erroneously to either anachronism or materialism. $X\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$ is not the kind of mother (Tim. 50c) that despotically give birth to things and holds them under her unavoidable control. She can also lead to death, as in Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus, but cannot be seen or perceived by the senses. When she is discovered, she has already vanished, and her posthumous showing up makes us rethink possibilities (circumstances) of origination, conception and construction.

Inscribed in the Derridean critic of substantialism, $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$ does not represent an $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$ from which things result and are organized; properly speaking she is not representable, as I will make clear through several examples taken from the contemporary performance arts. For Derrida, $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$ challenges classical ontology and hermeneutics and I argue that with her peculiar spatiality she is also challenging the temporal origin of things in order to inscribe it in a spatial-relational context. One of the consequences of this new frame is the strongly relational, but not relative, character of things situated in $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$: they are not substantial, as Nishida underlines in the recasting of $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$ as 絶対無の場所. $X\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$ cannot stand for a substratum of all things, because in her particular way of creation she is also affecting herself, that is, she is making things possible by disappearing. In following Nishida I claim that her function is to bridge and re-locate.

The purpose of the comparison between Nishida's and Derrida's analyses and between these analyses and the development of this ancient idea of generation is to provide a breeding ground for new ideas regarding origin and origination in a phenomenological comprehension of spatiality.

Panel 5: Pathways in Nishitani's Philosophy

“Mind as Relation. What Can Cognitive Science Learn from Nishitani's Philosophy?”

— Carlos Barbosa, *University of Pompeu Fabra*

What is Kyoto School's contribution to the philosophy of mind and cognitive science in our century—if there is any? In the century of neuroscience and artificial intelligence, this question is of crucial importance for an assessment of the contemporary relevance of Kyoto School philosophy. To this respect, there has been some interest in the possible contributions of Nishida's thought to the philosophy of mind and cognitive science—particularly the concept of active intuition. Yet, as I believe, Nishitani's philosophy also has a say in this area. And I would generally dare say that his contribution is complementary to Nishida's active intuition.

My proposal is to focus on what we could call his view of mind as relation, as elaborated in his book *Religion and Nothingness*. It can be observed that Nishitani reflects on the problem of what makes it possible for mind and things to be linked by means of a relation of knowing/understanding. He contends that any understanding (i.e. any relation of knowing by means of which we can engage with things) consists essentially in the attunement (習う) of mind with things. The form of this attunement is what he calls the double co-projection of mind (心) and thing (事): the mind's essence projects onto the thing's essence, and simultaneously the latter projects onto the former. The place where this attunement emerges is concrete, embodied self-awareness. In this context, meaning emerges out of the embodied co-projection of mind and thing. What we often know as “meaning” is a mere abstraction out of this live “relatedness in action”—so to speak.

The consequences for dialog with contemporary theories of mind from Nishitani's perspective are interesting in two

senses. First of all, we should be critical of conceptual theories of mind: they remain anchored to abstract meaning, hence do not reach the concretely embodied nature of mind. Secondly, it can be remarked that Nishitani's views are congenial to the enactivist trend in the philosophy of mind (v. Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, Andy Clark, etc), according to which the mind continually co-creates itself and its world by enacting both: mind is not "in the brain" or "out there," but in this field of co-creation. I will suggest that the dialog between both sides may help to strengthen the enactivist case.

"Alienation and Authenticity within Contemporary Japanese Society"

— Kyle Shuttleworth, *Queen's University Belfast*

In contemporary Western philosophy, the phenomenon of authenticity has of late become prevalent as a distinctly modern ideal. The fundamental feature of this concept is its emphasis on the discovery and articulation of one's own identity. Having gained traction as an ethical ideal in Europe, it will here be questioned whether it is possible for a theory of authenticity to be acclimatised within a non-Western cultural context. In order to demonstrate that this is indeed possible, the concept of 'Buddhist authenticity' will be proposed and developed in relation to the fundamental structures of Eastern culture. To achieve this aim, we will develop our account in accordance with Nishitani Keiji's and Watsuji Tetsuro's respective concepts of *Śūnyatā* and *Honraisei*. The purpose of developing an Eastern concept of authenticity is to address a sense of alienation—or loss of identity—which is often portrayed within Japanese sociological studies. Such studies illustrate that Japanese youths are attracted to contemporary fashions in the hope of expressing a sense of individuality, and that they attempt to derive a sense of purpose through association with emerging social trends. However, as social movements

are ephemeral, transitory, fleeting moments in cultural development, they are unable to provide a lasting foundation on which to develop a concrete personal identity. The concept of ‘Buddhist authenticity,’ on the other hand, is premised upon a deep-rooted sense of belonging, and offers a firm foundation upon which to devise a conception of the self. The aim of this enquiry, therefore, will be to appropriate authenticity within an Asian context, and in doing so, offer a resolution to the problem of alienation within contemporary Japanese society.

“Nothingness and freedom: A comparative analysis between Nishitani Keiji and Meister Eckhart’s Perspectives”

— Amanda Sayonara Fernandes Prazeres, *University of Pompeu Fabra*

Attempting to pursue a dialogue between Buddhism and Christianity through the medieval philosophy of Meister Eckhart is not new. In fact, the ideas exposed in the sermons of the medieval Dominican priest and philosopher are defined by D.T. Suzuki (1870–1966) in his book “Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist” as closely approached Buddhist thoughts, so closely indeed, that one could stamp them almost definitely as coming out of Buddhist speculations. Looking for a different philosophical approach, I aim to analyze the connection between the conceptions of nothingness and freedom in the Japanese philosopher Nishitani Keiji (1900–90), representative of the Kyoto School of philosophy, and Meister Eckhart’s perspectives. The purpose is to consider the convergences and divergences, and especially if in both the Christian and the Buddhist thinkers this freedom is understood not in an ethical sense, related with the action of a subject, but is interpreted as a religious solution to the traditional problem of the substantial perspective, based on western ontology. Discussing the context of the contemporary philosophical world of the nihilism and overcoming modernity discussions, for

Nishitani emptiness means freedom of the substantial outlook, which is not able to reach the reality in its truth, beyond concepts and representations. Conversely, Meister Eckhart's medieval discussions about the proof of God's existence and how men can be related with the sacred believe that the freedom caused by detachment (*Abgeschiedenheit*) is responsible for the encounter with the true nature of the God, namely the Godhead, in the ground of nothingness, beyond a creature's perspective, self, and will. That said, I aim to analyze comparatively how, for the Christian Medieval thinker and the Japanese philosopher with Zen Buddhist's bases, the freedom provoked by the realization of nothingness is a meontological answer religiously oriented, where one can reach reality in its truth and, especially, one can find the true-self.

Panel 6: *Aesthetics and Poetics*

“Esthétique, religion et laïcité chez Ernest Fenollosa et Okakura Tenshin”

— Arthur Mitteau, *INALCO & EHESS*

Ernest Fenollosa et Okakura Tenshin sont des penseurs qui ont eu des activités intellectuelles et sociales qui, quoique multiples, ont toutes tourné autour d'un enjeu : faire reconnaître en tant qu'art au sens le plus noble du terme (« fine art »), au Japon comme dans le monde, un certain nombre de pratiques et genres artistiques du Japon ancien. Pour cela, leur contribution à la genèse des institutions patrimoniales contemporaines au Japon est reconnue, mais celle-ci comporte aussi un volet intellectuel fondamental. Fenollosa est en effet l'un des introducteurs et des créateurs de la pensée esthétique moderne au Japon. Quant à Okakura, s'il était critique à l'égard de la démarche esthétique, définie comme théorisation de la pratique et du regard artistique selon des questions globales et philosophiques, ce penseur complexe a amplement puisé dans

le modèle défini par son ancien professeur de philosophie, Fenollosa. C'est ce modèle théorique, largement commun aux deux, qui a donc constitué une des premières approches philosophiques contemporaines au Japon.

Or dans ce cadre de mutation du monde de la pensée au Japon, l'un des signes de cette esthétique neuve est l'invention d'un discours philosophique voulu axiologiquement et méthodologiquement neutre par rapport aux questions religieuses. L'esthétique de Fenollosa et celle de Tenshin, comme leur historiographie, partageaient en cela l'ambition d'autres disciplines universitaires modernes au Japon, celle de se placer sur le même plan d'universalité que les disciplines académiques occidentales. Et pourtant, l'art japonais historique, comme d'autres, parle souvent de sujets religieux ; et l'esthétique elle-même ne peut faire l'économie d'intégrer des considérations sur la religion.

Le présent projet, fondé sur des recherches de doctorat, par d'une remarque effectuée au gré du commentaire d'un texte particulier de Fenollosa, dans lequel celui-ci tente d'échafauder une théorie d'inspiration hégélienne de la peinture religieuse associée au bouddhisme du Grand Véhicule, en parlant du « dieu présent en l'homme », avec des intonations fort feuerbachiennes. Cette figure d'une divinité comprise comme idée régulatrice compatible avec un matérialisme athée, serait, selon lui, exprimée par l'idéal de la voie des bodhisattva, et par les œuvres d'art associées. L'intérêt de cette observation est l'hypothèse que l'on peut en tirer, que Fenollosa, comme après lui Okakura, ont cherché à définir un discours valorisateur, historicisant, esthétisant sur l'art japonais, qui permette de parler de la valeur esthétique des œuvres en s'appuyant sur la dimension religieuse de celles-ci, tout en étant potentiellement recevable par des croyants comme par des non-croyants. Il faut en effet observer que cette attitude traverse absolument tous leurs textes, et ce, alors que l'un et l'autre étaient croyants, adeptes de l'école Tendai. De ce fait, le projet qui apparaît chez

eux semble bien la création du discours esthétique comme un espace discursif commun, destiné à assurer l'échange d'idées et de valeurs en matière d'art quelle que soit l'attitude religieuse – ce qui constitue, bien sûr, un aspect parmi d'autres de l'universalisme de ces auteurs. Qu'est-ce que la création d'un discours « laïque », au sens d'ouvert à la différence religieuse ou athée, dans un contexte d'origine non-occidentale? Et qu'est-ce que cela indique sur ce qui peut paraître comme la nature même de la pensée esthétique?

“La dialectique et le symbolisme : une lecture de *La Philosophie artistique de Valéry* de Hajime Tanabe”

— Masumi Sunaba-Sevrin, *INALCO*

La philosophie de l'art de Valéry publiée en 1951 est l'œuvre d'un grand philosophe de l'école de Kyoto, Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962). Paul Valéry (1871-1945), poète français, a longtemps été élevé au rang d'idole, la grande intelligence du XXe siècle. C'est sûrement dans ce contexte avant tout que Tanabe a lu Valéry, bien que le portrait de ce dernier soit aujourd'hui plus nuancé et que la figure valérienne ne soit plus classée comme purement intellectuelle. Mais il est évident, en lisant Tanabe, que celui-ci devinait déjà, au-delà de l'intelligence pure, un être mystique chez Valéry, ce qui ne laisse pas de surprendre. Cherchant à préciser la notion de « la philosophie de l'art », Tanabe se concentre sur son tête-à-tête avec Valéry, et ne fait quasiment pas référence aux autres études sur cet auteur. Cette abstraction de l'existant lui permet de découvrir ce trait de personnalité pas encore connu à l'époque qui a, plus que tout le reste, déclenché l'intérêt du philosophe japonais pour l'écrivain français.

Comment la pensée de Paul Valéry réussit-elle à intéresser ce philosophe japonais? Une raison de la passion qu'éprouve Tanabe pour Valéry tient à ce qu'il reconnaît dans la réflexion valérienne le reflet de sa propre pensée. Cette parenté

intellectuelle est si importante qu'il considère que Valéry personnifie sa logique « dialectique », l'idée primordiale de sa philosophie. Tanabe analyse les œuvres de l'écrivain français dans l'ordre chronologique et essaie de retracer les vicissitudes de la pensée valéryenne avec sa propre logique dialectique. Pour cela, il décompose en deux époques la vie intellectuelle de Valéry : d'une part *Introduction à la méthode de Léonard de Vinci* (1895) – *La soirée avec Monsieur Teste* (1896) – *Eupalinos* (1921) et d'autre part, *La Jeune Parque* (1917) – *Introduction à la poésie* (1937).

Tanabe explique la logique inhérente des trois œuvres de la première période en leur appliquant une relation dialectique : la « critique absolue » kantienne conduit à la « médiation absolue » hégélienne, et enfin ces deux se réunissent en passant par une sorte de « conversion radicale ». Dans la logique de Tanabe, cette dialectique représente le processus de création des œuvres d'art. La conversion, – intimement liée à la notion de néant –, est ainsi identifiée à l'effet poétique que le symbolisme sait produire. Le philosophe traduit et interprète *La Jeune Parque* comme le fait Alain, et admire l'*Introduction à la poésie*, première leçon donnée par le poète au Collège de France. Il y découvre une tentative d'expliquer le mécanisme du poème, et est très étonné par la présence des notions économiques de production et de consommation dans la poésie de Valéry.

L'art intervient dans la philosophie, et l'économie inspire l'art. La métaphysique kantienne est liée à la physiologie de Théodore Ribault. Le néant bouddhiste s'identifie à l'effet symboliste. Ce livre de Tanabe, qui voit la rencontre de deux esprits d'Orient et d'Occident, nous donne un exemple de liberté totale, qui doit être une condition de la pensée.

“Le point de vue commun sur l’art de Bergson et Zeami”

— Suguru Kawasato, *Université de Nagoya*

Dans ce travail, je chercherai à démontrer qu’il existe une pensée commune sur l’art entre le philosophe français Henri Bergson (1859-1941) et le dramaturge japonais Zeami (1363-1443). Je me servirai dans cette étude de l’idée d’Aristote, en tant qu’intermédiaire entre ces deux penseurs.

En effet, la différence temporelle, culturelle et spatiale qui sépare Bergson et Zeami ne semble pas avoir empêché ceux-ci de développer une pensée similaire sur ce qu’est l’art. Je tacherai d’examiner par trois points quelle est cette pensée commune. Tout d’abord, je montrerai en quoi chez Bergson et Zeami l’œuvre d’art a pour but de montrer la figure réelle de ce qui échappe habituellement à nos yeux. J’étudierai ensuite les deux notions de mimesis *μίμησις* et de forme *型 kata*, qui apparaissent toutes deux dans la pensée de Bergson et de Zeami. Enfin, je montrerai la relation qui existe entre le rythme et l’esprit suggérée par les deux auteurs.

La forme et le rythme sont tous deux profondément liés à l’émotion artistique. Par leur intermédiaire, l’œuvre d’art nous révèle la vraie figure de l’objet et de l’événement, selon l’intuition de l’artiste. Le grand artiste ne crée pas son œuvre en suivant son émotion individuelle, mais, au contraire, il dépasse son ego afin de montrer la figure de l’objet ou de l’événement qu’il observe. La vue de l’artiste est une petite chose en comparaison de ce que ce monde possède. Le grand artiste souhaite et peut saisir cela par son observation persévérante du monde. Dans ce cas, il ne s’agit pas d’une manifestation émotionnelle de l’artiste, mais d’une représentation de la véritable figure de ce que ce monde possède, représentation faite en utilisant la forme et le rythme.

L’œuvre d’art peut présenter la figure réelle de l’objet et de l’événement. Pour Bergson en effet, « [L’artiste] réalisera ainsi la plus haute ambition de l’art, qui est ici de nous révéler la na-

ture.» (*Le Rire*, 119). De même, Zeami pense que l'acteur du Nô se doit d'imiter fidèlement le caractère du personnage qu'il joue : « Il ne faut se préoccuper que de la seule ressemblance. D'autre part, si l'on rendait fidèlement ce qui est puissant, on serait spontanément puissant » (*La tradition secrète du Nô*, 98). Il existe à la fois chez Bergson et Zeami cette même importance à pouvoir montrer par l'art la figure de ce monde. Il n'existe aucune interprétation arbitraire de l'artiste et de l'acteur. Il ne doit pas s'agir de l'expression émotionnelle de l'individu.

D'autre part, Bergson et Zeami traitent communément du problème de la forme (型). Bergson pense que les artistes doivent dans un premier temps imiter la forme créée par les grands artistes qui les précèdent, puis, après avoir appris leur forme de l'art, il pense que l'on peut imiter la beauté de la nature, la totalité du monde changeant. De même, Zeami montre que, à travers la forme, la vue de l'acteur est ouverte vers la totalité. Selon lui, « C'est précisément après avoir accompli les normes de sa manière propre que l'on sera en mesure de connaître l'ensemble des manières » (*Ibid*, 92). Lorsque Zeami inventa le Nô, il n'existait alors aucune théorie sur ce qu'était ou devait être le Nô. C'est lui qui a fixé ce qu'est le Nô traditionnel. En ce point, il existe une différence entre Bergson et Zeami, puisque le premier voit la forme comme la chose à imiter tandis que le second comme ce qu'il faut inventer. Cependant, ils présentent tous deux le même point de vue, celui selon lequel on pourrait s'ouvrir à la totalité via la forme.

Chez Bergson et Zeami, il existe une relation entre le rythme et l'esprit. Bergson analyse le sentiment de grâce né de la danse, par le mouvement du corps. Ce mouvement du corps indique le mouvement de l'esprit. Via ce mouvement du corps, on trouve le sentiment de grâce. Zeami partage la même pensée que Bergson dans ses « cinq modes d'exécution du Nô », notamment dans le troisième mode qui consiste à intégrer harmonieusement « le style orné » et « le style dépouillé ». Le style orné accompagne la forme concrète, c'est-

à-dire la forme visuelle et auditive. Le style dépouillé possède au contraire la beauté de l'esprit sans avoir de forme concrète. Quand les deux styles sont bien combinés, le Nô excelle. C'est ce que Zeami nomme «le mode combiné».

A travers le développement de ces trois points, je chercherai s'il existe une pensée universelle de l'art en réfléchissant aux idées émises par Bergson et Zeami.

Panel 7: *Nishida's Philosophy in Dialogue*

“La philosophie kantienne et *La quête du Bien* (1911) de Nishida Kitarō”

— Takako Saitō, *INALCO*

L'introduction de la philosophie kantienne au Japon remonte aux années 1870. Dans la faculté des lettres de l'université impériale de Tôkyô, de 1887 à 1892, Ludwig Busse, docteur de l'université de Berlin, a assuré le cours sur l'idéalisme allemand. En 1890, Nakajima Rikizô, après avoir obtenu un *Philosophiae doctor* à l'université Yale au bout de ses dix ans de séjour aux Etats-Unis, a débuté son enseignement de la philosophie à l'université impériale de Tôkyô et il a introduit la philosophie morale de Thomas Hill Green. Entre 1893 et 1914, Raphael von Koeber, docteur de l'université d'Iéna, a succédé à L. Busse, et a enseigné notamment les philosophies grecque, médiévale et allemande. Il a enthousiasmé les étudiants japonais et son influence était considérable sur les futurs intellectuels japonais. Dans ce contexte, la première collection des textes majeurs de Kant, traduits en japonais en 18 volumes, a vu le jour entre 1918 et 1939.

Cependant avant la première de traduction en japonais de *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können* en 1914, la notion de personne kantienne, la personne doit être considérée comme une fin en soi, et le personnalisme (*jinkaku shugi*) kantien étaient

déjà largement connus. Nishida Kitarô a suivi les cours de L. Busse, Nakajima Rikizô et R. von Koeber. Sa première publication en 1895 était intitulée *Gurin shi rinri tetsugaku no taii* (Les grandes lignes de la philosophie morale de Thomas H. Green) et il exposait l'idée du Bien et de la volonté humaine selon ce philosophe anglais. En 1911, ce philosophe japonais a publié son premier livre *La quête du Bien*. Il constate que « la personne comme une fin en soi » de Kant est largement connue, mais il se demande ce que serait un acte qui s'appuierait sur cette notion de la personne (NKZ 1: 153). Nishida ne s'est pas contenté de citer des sources anglaise et allemande, mais il a développé sa pensée de la « personne » qui est une puissance unificatrice de la conscience, et cette puissance doit viser le Bien au fur à mesure de son développement (NKZ 1: 151). Elle se réalise d'abord dans l'individualité (*kojin sei*) (NKZ 1: 157). Nous tenterons d'élucider le concept de la « personne » en relation avec l'individualité, la liberté, l'amour et l'expérience pure, expliqués dans ce texte de Nishida.

“William James and Nishida Kitarô: On the Edge of Experience in a Global Era”

— Simitzi G. Sofia, *University of Ioannina*

As the title indicates, this announcement is about a Pragmatist view in a crucial era of global over turnings, conflicts and subversions; it is about a modus of thinking and an open option for West and East. Via Jamesean Pragmatism and the notion of Nishida's Empiricism it is possible to widen the range of Philosophical Anthropology and social attitude on the edge of experience.

William James' Philosophy sheds new light on the concepts of Experience and Intersubjectivity.

In the context of nineteenth-century Darwinism, W. James appears to be strongly influenced by the biological approach. He construes the human being as a striving, goal-positing, in-

terest-fulfilling organism, whose seminal characteristic is his willful assumption, and attempted implementation, of specific practical ends. This amounts to arguing that our revered intellectual operations are worthwhile only in the context of such ends. Our prized cognitive pursuits—concept formation, theory construction, etc.—operate as tools which are limited, and molded, by the individual's desires. James' teleological conception of the mind, and the primacy he assigns to action, create the appearance of curtailing the importance of intellectual pursuits. He seems to present humanity as narrowly motivated by the fulfillment of its biological needs and practical ends. When he analyzes truth in terms of the cash value of an idea, he reinforces the image of a philosophy on the brink of the linguistic turn, narrowly utilitarian and reductionist. Radical Empiricism constitutes an attempt to analyze the nature of reality at a critical philosophical level. His intention is not to ignore the pragmatic realities of common sense, described in ordinary language, but to elucidate their dark side—their ultimate metaphysical basis—and to place them in the context of an ontological theory. Densely put, everything real must be somehow experience able, and everything experienced must somehow be real.

His empiricism is radical because, in its context, the relations between things are held to be as real, and as much a part of experience, as the things themselves. The ultimate metaphysical reality is the continuous stream of pure (and enigmatic) experience. Conceptual thought does not represent experience as it truly is, since experience is continuous and shifting where concepts are fixed and discontinuous.

Even personal consciousness is nothing but the name for a series of experiences run together by certain definite transitions. Therefore consciousness, for W. James and Nishida Kitarō, is not a pre-given thing but rather an emergent process, shaped and fed by the body's agency.

Pluralistic in his outlook and comparative in his method-

ology Kitarō, was throughout his life deeply influenced by James Philosophical Formulation. Nishida Kitarō in this way believed that he was attempting to synthesize the philosophical worlds of east and west into a new form of philosophical inquiry. For Nishida Kitarō, pure experience can be cultivated in bodily practice as a bodily field of experience and subsequently as a form transformative praxis with a given aesthetic, ethical expression.

According to James, Religious Experiences are the result of natural as well as supernatural relations. Not only do they present us with evocative information on the structure of everyday reality, but provide us with intriguing evidence for the putative existence of an unseen order of the self as well as of reality.

James as Kitarō gave the epistemic primacy to experience in contrast to the theoretical certainty. Therefore experiences can and should undermine our taken-for-granted naturalistic conception of all things; moreover, they provide philosophy with the “raw data” necessary in order to create a fruitful, non-dogmatic, Theo-metaphysical picture of reality. A thesis more crucial than ever in this global era where the collapse of the symbolic order let the individual exposed to cosmopolitanism in search for the meaning of experience and cosmos.

Panel 8: *Kuki and the Problem of Metaphysics*

“La rencontre comme phénomène originaire. Kuki Shūzō, phénoménologue de la contingence”

— Simon Ebersolt, *INALCO & Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne*

Kuki Shūzō a divisé son livre principal, *Le problème de la contingence* (1935), en trois parties, correspondant à trois définitions de la contingence – l’individuel, la rencontre et le possible –, elles-mêmes des reprises de notions aristotéliennes : *symbēbēkos* pour la première définition, *automaton* et *tychē* pour la deuxième, *endechomenon* pour la troisième. La prin-

cipale originalité du philosophe japonais consiste en ce qu'il a pensé ces trois sens comme « unis indistinctement », tout en considérant le phénomène de la rencontre comme le sens « nodal » de la contingence, autrement dit comme originaire par rapport à l'individuel et au possible.

Or, Kuki a forgé sa théorie de la contingence dans un contexte philosophique particulier, la découverte des œuvres de Husserl et de Heidegger en Allemagne, si bien qu'il a affirmé que « si l'expression "aux choses mêmes" est l'affirmation fondamentale de la phénoménologie, la vraie philosophie doit être une phénoménologie ».

En réfléchissant sur la vision que Kuki a de la phénoménologie et sa traduction-interprétation de l'*originär gebende Anschauung*, nous verrons que son idée de phénomène et sa caractérisation de la contingence comme rencontre convergent vers un point, celui du donné qui n'est pas constitué par le sujet de la connaissance. C'est le phénomène de la rencontre qui joue chez Kuki le rôle de principe dans sa philosophie première, au sens de philosophie dévoilant le principe inconditionné de tout apparaît, la primauté de la phénoménalité : tout étant suppose originairement la rencontre, qui est la phénoménalité même ; en ce sens, la rencontre contingente n'a rien d'exceptionnel ou de miraculeux, elle est le mode d'exposition selon lequel advient tout donné.

Ainsi, nous montrerons que la théorie de la contingence chez Kuki est une réinterprétation phénoménologique de la définition aristotélicienne de la contingence comme rencontre et que sa philosophie première est une phénoménologie de la contingence.

“L'être comme contingent : un essai sur l'être chez
Heidegger”

— Kentarō Otagiri, *Kyoto University*

Dans notre présentation, nous allons examiner concept de

l'être dans les derniers textes de Martin Heidegger. Il s'agira notamment de poser la question suivante : Peut-on trouver une contingence dans le concept de l'être lui-même (*Sein selbst*) et dans quel sens. Il nous faut d'abord évoquer ici le nom de Markus Gabriel qui a déjà examiné cette question de son propre point de vue. Gabriel montre, en s'appuyant sur *L'Ethica Nicomaque* d'Aristote, sa définition du contingent : « ce qui puisse être autrement [dasjenige, was anders sein könnte (*ὃ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως εἶχειν*)] » (Gabriel 2010, 88). Selon cette définition l'être, s'il est contingent, doit comporter la possibilité en lui-même ou un pouvoir potentiel. Mais selon la conclusion des considérations de Gabriel, on ne trouve pas chez Heidegger du pouvoir de « peut être autrement » dans l'être lui-même, mais seulement une possibilité de « peut être interprété autrement » par l'homme. Selon le point de vue de Gabriel, on doit interpréter aussi la « *Seinsgeschichte* » de Heidegger comme une histoire des interprétations diverses de l'être ou comme une succession des concepts divers sur l'être. Mais selon notre compréhension, Gabriel saisit improprement le concept de l'être lui-même et de la « *Seinsgeschichte* » chez Heidegger. Nous voudrions alors dans cette présentation élucider la contingence de l'être lui-même chez Heidegger en critiquant la compréhension de Gabriel.

Le point important de nos considérations dans cette présentation est le sens de la phénoménalité ou de la phénoménologie chez Heidegger, parce que selon Gabriel Heidegger ne peut pas tenir compte du caractère phénoménologique de la phénoménalité. Selon mon avis c'est important de montrer le sens de la phénoménalité dans le 7^e paragraphe d'*Être et temps* (1927) de Heidegger. Il y distingue 4 sens du phénomène, c'est-à-dire, 1. « *das Sich-zeigende* » ou « *das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende* », 2. « *Schein* », 3. « *Erscheinung* », 4. « *bloße Erscheinung* » en tant que concept de phénomène vulgaire (Cf. GA 2, 38 f.). A. Schnell redistribue ces concepts selon « l'auto-donation » et « la hétéro-donation » (Cf. Schnell

2005, 25) . L'auto-donation est le phénomène de lui-même, et l'hétéro-donation est phénomène d'une autre chose. Le phénomène propre de la phénoménologie heideggerienne est 1. le concept comme auto-donation. Je rappelle cette distinction entre l'auto-donation et l'hétéro-donation, parce qu'elle renvoie à la distinction entre ce qui est contingent « par l'autre » et ce qui est contingent « par lui-même » chez le dernier Schelling (Cf. SW II-1, 464). Il me semble qu'il est possible de proposer une distinction pareille entre l'auto-contingence et l'hétéro-contingence et que l'on peut élucider le sens de la contingence de l'être lui-même chez Heidegger comme auto-contingence. Dans ce cas-là, je pense que le concept de la « contingence disjunctive » (離接の偶然) de S. Kuki joue aussi un rôle important. Je voudrais donc, en somme, montrer avec Schelling et Kuki le sens de la contingence de l'être lui-même chez Heidegger.

1. Cf. Gabriel, Markus: „Unvordenkliches Sein und Ereignis. Der Seinsbegriff beim späten Schelling und beim späten Heidegger“, in: Heideggers Schelling-Seminar (1927/28). Hg. von Lore Hühn u. Jörg Jantzen. Stuttgart: fromman-holzboog 2010 (=Schellingiana Bd. 22. Hg. von Walter E. Ehrhardt u. Jochem Hennigfeld im Auftrag der Internationalen Schelling-Gesellschaft), S. 81–112.

2. Cf. Schnell, Alexander: De l'existence ouverte au monde fini. Heidegger 1925–1930. Paris: Vrin 2005, S. 25.

Panel 9: *Watsuji and Philosophy of Nature*

“Fūdo 風土: History, Language, and Philosophy”

— David W. Johnson, *Boston College*

One of the most important and least well-understood notions in Watsuji Tetsurō's philosophical oeuvre is the concept of fūdo 風土. The aim of this paper is to provide an explanatory overview of this concept, including a summary of its history and usage and an explanation of how it relates to and can be distinguished from the concept of nature.

This task is made more difficult by the complexity, richness, and philosophical novelty of this notion, on the one hand, and by Watsuji's own piecemeal, inconsistent, and ambiguously formulated presentation of it, on the other. These factors have led to an array of conflicting interpretations concerning the scope and nature of this concept.

The difficulties of understanding here have been further compounded by the widespread use of the word *climate* to translate *fūdo* into English, which is a misleading simplification that does not reflect the complex meaning that Watsuji attributed to this term. For this reason, I elect to leave this term untranslated. While this approach allows us to avoid the distortion and loss of meaning which have plagued previous translations of *fūdo*, using a new and unfamiliar concept from a foreign language in a philosophical study also presents a different kind of challenge to the understanding.

The rest of the paper adjudicates between conflicting interpretations of *fūdo* and shows how the semantic and philosophical dimensions of this term, as well as the cultural and historical background in which it is situated, come together for Watsuji in the coherent whole of a new philosophical concept—one which reveals the way in which the self and the natural environment belong together as aspects of a single, unitary phenomenon.

“Φύσις et 風土: Heidegger, Watsuji et le sens du monde”

— Wawrzyn Warkocki, *Université Toulouse – Jean Jaurès*
 & *Bergische Universität Wuppertal*

Notre exposé se propose de mener une lecture croisée des philosophies de Martin Heidegger et de Watsuji Tatsurō à partir de deux concepts-clés de leurs pensées respectives : la *physis* et le *fūdo*. Il s'agira de les faire dialoguer pour restituer le sens profond du monde qui ne soit réductible ni à la simple objectivité subordonnée à la recherche scientifique, ni au cor-

rélat d'une subjectivité transcendante donatrice de sens.

En premier lieu, il nous faudra analyser le concept de milieu (*fūdo*), tel qu'on le trouve dans l'ouvrage emblématique de Watsuji *Fūdo*, traduit en français par *Fūdo*, le milieu humain. Nous nous appuyerons principalement sur le premier chapitre théorique « Théorie fondamentale du milieu », qui élabore le concept de milieu dans un dialogue explicite avec Être et temps de Heidegger. Car en effet, c'est une lecture approfondie de ce même ouvrage au cours de son séjour en Europe, l'année même de sa publication, qui incita Watsuji à critiquer ce qui constitue à ses yeux une insuffisance majeure : le défaut d'élaboration claire de la question de la spatialité du Dasein. Heidegger voit dans l'horizon de la temporalité une condition pour le Dasein de se poser la question de l'être. Or l'existence humaine et son « historicité » ne sont intelligibles qu'en faisant appel à l'autre condition qui façonne profondément la vie : l'espace. C'est ce qui poussera Watsuji à s'affronter directement au problème du milieu. Dans cet exposé, nous mettrons cette critique à l'épreuve en la confrontant à la notion heideggerienne de monde telle qu'elle est développée aussi bien dans Être et temps que dans les œuvres ultérieures de Heidegger.

En second lieu, nous aborderons le concept heideggerien de physis, qui traverse toute son œuvre, ainsi que le concept voisin de mouvance (*Bewegtheit*) qui boucle les deux côtés du « tournant » sous les vocables de facticité et d'Ereignis. En prenant pour référence la mésologie d'Augustin Berque, qui est influencée autant par Heidegger que par Watsuji, nous mettrons face à face les notions de physis et de *fūdo* pour élaborer un sens enrichi du monde naturel échappant à la Charibde du naturalisme et à la Scylla de l'irréalisme.

“Watsuji and Nishida on the Predictability of Nature”

— Yū Inutsuka, *University of Tokyo*

The problems of environmental destruction urgently require

us to reconsider our conception of human beings, the environment, and nature. In recent study of environmental ethics, the thought of Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō has given a necessary orientation toward the inseparability of human beings and the environment (e.g., Berque 1996; McRae 2014). His thought depicts a human existence that is not limited to an entity within an individual body but extends outside it. This means that the environment is not an external world but is an integral part of what makes up human beings. A key element in this understanding of the unity of human beings and the environment is repetition and predictability (Inutsuka 2017). The repetition of day and night, of the seasons, and of other aspects of nature, which are found by human beings, in turn enable us to form certain cultural ways of living and predict others' actions in communal life.

However, Watsuji did not focus on the unpredictable reality of nature. Passions arise spontaneously and physical phenomena disrupt our fixed activities and social structure, against our expectations. These unpredictable phenomena are, moreover, indispensable for our self-development in creative activities both at the individual and the collective levels: irrepressible passion makes man create art and disasters make communities reform and find a new way of living. Keeping both predictability and unpredictability in mind, this paper aims to reconsider the relationship between human beings and nature through a comparison of the thought of Watsuji and Nishida Kitarō. In his early philosophy, Nishida discusses passions that express themselves through our bodies against our will. In his late phase, he shows how historical nature develops itself through our creative activities. By connecting the early Nishida's work on expression and that of the later Nishida on nature, this paper approaches the unpredictability of nature in our self-development. Finally, Nishida and Watsuji are compared to show us a possible conflict between creation, requiring unpredictability, and ethics, requiring the predict-

ability of the unity of human beings and the environment, and need for their harmonization on this planet.

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Panel 10: *Pathways in Nishida's Philosophy*

"The Relationship of Matter and Idea in Nishida Kitarō's
Concept of 'active intuition'"

— Jonatan Navarro, *University of Barcelona*

One of the most discussed contemporary problems in metaphysics is that of the role of matter and material objects in our conceptions of reality, and how to include them into the philosophical reflections of the most important philosophical disciplines, which have, until now, privileged idealism over materialism. New philosophical materialisms, as well as new naturalist interpretations of German Idealism try to overcome this dualism by thinking of objects and matter as not merely passive but active constituents of transcendentalism.

According to Aristotle, matter is always already given in a form, and it is form that makes matter intelligible. Without form, matter has no meaning, and thus metaphysics deals only with the ideal. For thinkers like Iain Hamilton Grant, this Aristotelian understanding of matter lies also at the heart of Immanuel Kant's philosophy: matter has meaning as long as it is

structured within and according to the human categories of understanding. Whatever lies behind these categories is the thing-in-itself, of which no knowledge is possible. For Grant, there is here a dualism according to which matter and idea are ontologically different, with matter making sense only as structured within the idea.

There is a hierarchy where the spiritual-ideal world of human dominates matter. This structure is dominant in Western thought, especially in all the contemporary philosophical disciplines, like phenomenology or hermeneutics, all of them sharing the presuppositions of Kantian metaphysics. Many thinkers see in this ontological priority of spirit over matter an unconscious justification for the human exploitation of nature.

This research looks at the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945) in the light of these new materialisms. In fact, his philosophical endeavor consisted in trying to overcome the spirit-matter dualism that he saw as permeating all the Western tradition of thought. He did so dealing directly with Aristotle and Kant. For this, he created a logic of transduction of opposites in which idea and matter, subject and object, are co-constituents of each other in the dynamic process of transcendental becoming. I will focus on how this transduction of matter and idea works in the Nishidean concept of “active intuition,” developed during the last years of his philosophical production. I argue that Nishida’s logic can shed light into questions relevant for new materialisms regarding the role of matter and objects in relation with the ideal as co-constituents of transcendentality.

“Transformation du corps et de la conscience à travers l’apprentissage des *kata* (型)”

— Mika Imono, *Université de Strasbourg*

L’objectif de cette présentation est de décrire la transformation du corps et de la conscience et leur rapport à travers l’appren-

tissage du mouvement. Il s'agit notamment de l'apprentissage des séries de mouvements qu'on appelle kata dans la culture japonaise.

Dans une plus grande perspective, cette tentative s'intègre dans la problématique de l'habitude ; elle sera étudiée dans le contexte philosophique de la rencontre entre le spiritualisme français et la philosophie japonaise autour de l'habitude.

Dans la dernière phase de la philosophie de Kitarô Nishida (1870-1945), ce philosophe japonais a intégré la pensée sur l'aperception chez Maine de Biran (1766-1824) dans celle sur l'habitude de Félix Ravaisson (1813-1900). Selon le japonais, la formation de l'habitude elle-même s'assimile avec la formation du monde historique, se formant entre l'activité et la passivité, et c'est d'où émerge l'individualité du sujet. Ceci nous montre à la fois la continuité et la discontinuité du mouvement volontaire (ou d'auto-éveil dans le terme nishidien) au sein de l'habitude. Ce schème selon lequel le mouvement et la conscience se forment dans l'habitude nous permet d'étudier notre manière d'être intimement liée à notre propre corps à nous.

Or, cette manière d'apparaître de la conscience qui ne suppose pas d'abord que les substances existent mais qui suppose la formation elle-même d'où dérivent la différenciation des substances, n'est pas quelque chose de nouveau, mais elle a été remarquée par les philosophes du XXe siècle comme Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Derrida ou Michel Henry. Dans la philosophie japonaise contemporaine, elle est surtout reconnue sous la notion de la voix moyenne dans cette dizaine d'années (Bin Kimura (2014), Aki Morita (2013), etc.). Notre présentation s'engagera également à cette recherche, et nous essayons d'aborder ce thème surtout avec la problématique de l'habitude du corps propre, vu par le sujet du mouvement.

L'apprentissage du kata nous semble intéressant dans ce contexte. Pourquoi le kata? Parce que, comme l'a bien remarqué Ryôden Minamoto (1989), l'apprentissage d'une série de mouvements qu'on appelle kata est la recherche de la forme

idéale de la forme ; ce dont il s'agit n'est donc pas un seul mouvement surgi dans l'habitude, mais de tout le processus de répétition corporelle pour arriver à l'idéal par l'aide de l'habitude. Aussi, la recherche de kata est à la fois corporelle et morale, comme le souligne les livres sur l'art martial comme sur le théâtre du Nô. Ceci nous permettra d'étudier la transformation de la conscience liée à celle du corps ainsi que leur relation.

En nous référant aux auteurs cités, à la fin de cette présentation, nous viendrons à décrire l'habitude du corps propre en tant que lieu de genèse, qui est à la fois à moi et n'est pas moi-même.

“*Ego et Jiko*. Esquisse pour une étude comparée des formes du problème de l'intériorité”

— Raphaël Pierres, *Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne*

Il est possible de déceler, au fil de l'Histoire de la philosophie japonaise, une tendance à identifier la modernité occidentale au sujet cartésien, fût-ce pour les dépasser ; cela semble conforter une opposition rapide selon lequel un Orient idéalisé ne poserait pas la question du sujet, ou pas avant une rencontre avec l'Occident symbolisée par les jésuites en Chine, puis par Meiji au Japon.

Or, cette histoire doit affronter une première difficulté textuelle : non seulement le terme de «sujet» n'apparaît pas en ce sens chez Descartes, mais il refuse explicitement cette manière de qualifier la «chose qui pense» lorsque Hobbes la lui propose dans les Troisièmes objections.

En revanche, nous rencontrons bien diverses pratiques d'introspection et de travail intérieur, associées à des représentations de l'esprit comme intériorité, non seulement chez Descartes, mais dans l'Histoire de la philosophie japonaise.

Il ne s'agit pas pour nous de recevoir cette ressemblance tendue et inattendue sans critique, mais au contraire d'en faire une source de questions transversales, à la lumière de certaines

des leçons tirées de Wittgenstein.

Poser le problème de l'intériorité dans ces deux contextes vise ainsi à déjouer la question piégée d'un « sujet » qui ne dit son nom ni chez Descartes, ni chez Nishida, pour rouvrir un espace de dialogue et de comparaison conceptuellement déterminée autour de la question du soi comme « lieu intérieur » dans les philosophies d'expression française et japonaise.

L'espace intérieur fonctionne-t-il comme image féconde pour concevoir le soi, ou bien la tentative-même de soumettre le soi à la logique du lieu fait-elle tomber dans une erreur de catégorie qui le rend inintelligible ?

Le point focal de ce questionnement portera sur une analyse ciblée des modalités selon lesquelles ego cartésien et jiko nishidéen sont associées au paradoxe d'un lieu qui n'appartient pas à l'espace.

Dans le cadre de ce moment consacré à la philosophie comparée, cette communication s'efforcera ainsi de contribuer à éclairer avec les outils de l'histoire de la philosophie un moment identifié comme clé dans la réception de la philosophie européenne moderne au Japon, et d'en tirer finalement quelques leçons concrètes au plan de la compréhension du problème de l'intériorité.

Panel 11: *Kuki's Contingency in Comparison*

“Primary Contingency and Absolute Nothing:

Being and Nothing in the Philosophy of Kuki Shūzō and Nishida Kitarō”

— Kazuaki Oda, *Osaka University*

The main theme of the philosophy of Kuki Shūzō (1888–1941) is contingency. Contingency is the being which could be non-being. In other words, contingency is the fragile being which is on the boundary line between being and nothing. He studies, therefore, the philosophy of existentialism, of such

philosophers Nietzsche, Jaspers and Heidegger and names his collected papers *Human Being and Existence*. Being is one of the most important topics in the philosophy of Kuki.

On the other hand, the central figure of modern Japanese philosophy is Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945). This means that modern Japanese philosophy is centered on the philosophy of nothing. Nishida writes hardly anything about the philosophy of Kuki. On the contrary, Kuki is keenly conscious of Nishida when he discusses his philosophy of contingency. He claims that “primary contingency” and “self-determination of the absolute nothing” is almost same. In short, Kuki thinks that they share the basis of philosophy. The key words of them are directly opposite but we can find a lot of common ideas in their philosophies.

We can find, however, not only common ideas but also some differences. Nishida’s absolute nothing is “the universal of universals,” namely, the universal which connotes everything. The philosophy of Nishida is based on absolute nothing. This means that his philosophy can be described from the viewpoint of the universal. Kuki’s Primary contingency is also the absolute. But he introduces this concept from the viewpoint of the empirical. He finds primary contingency as the ideal foundation of experience. He also explains the absolute from the metaphysical viewpoint. He presumes the whole of all the beings and events and calls it “absolute metaphysical necessity.” He eventually concludes that primary contingency and absolute metaphysical necessity are both sides of the same absolute. But it is clear that he gives more weight to primary contingency. He emphasizes experience of the individual. Primary contingency implies transcendence and precariousness of the world. We can say that the metaphysics of Kuki is the one of the existentialist. In short, Nishida looks down at the world and self from the position of the universal and Kuki looks up at them from the position of an individual.

Both of them describe the absolute as the basis of philosophy but their viewpoints are different.

“Originary Event” and “Spontaneous Breaking of Symmetry”: The Attitudes of Kuki Shūzō and Nanbu Yoichiro toward the Causal Law”

— Takashi Okinaga, *Teikyo University*

In this presentation, we focus on the Japanese thinkers Kuki Shūzō (九鬼周造) and Nanbu Yoichiro (南部陽一郎), who attached importance to phenomena that are unexplained by causal laws. Their views are important with regard to the origin of universe and the ultimate question about nature.

Kuki looked at chance, as opposed to necessity, and presented arguments about the “originary event” or “disjunctive happening” in the creation of “being” from “nothing.” For him, the origin of the whole universe is ultimately irrational, because such an event requires a break with rationality.

By contrast, Nanbu does not try to identify the cause of the “breaking of symmetry” in which elementary particles obtained their masses and then constituted the universe. Nor does he suppose that something like volition brought about that “breaking.” In a sense, the “breaking” happened of itself. This may be the meaning of “spontaneous.” When the “breaking of symmetry” happened in the “vacuum state,” the “breaking” was produced neither by mechanical causality nor by the volition of that state. Therefore, our universe was created in neither of these ways.

Both thinkers find the true essence of nature less in law than in the breaking of it. However, we should acknowledge a difference between them in their flexibility toward the causal law. Kuki stresses our “astonishment” when we face the fact that being was created from nothing. It is true that this reflects Kuki’s interest in the breaking of causality, but we do not have such an “astonishment” unless we already ascribe strong reali-

ty to the causal law in the first place.

By contrast, Nanbu frankly insists on such a “fluctuation” as the “spontaneous breaking of symmetry,” even in the “vacuum,” because any cause of that breaking would not have existed in the “vacuum.” This insistence may suggest his flexible attitude, avoiding the pedantic question of asking for the ultimate law that regulates the creation of the universe and not making the causal law an absolute rule. This attitude seems to suggest his respect for nature as it is rather than for pedantic laws concerning it.

An alternative to this attitude is surely the popular, scientific attitude, like that of the American physicist Alan Guth, who wonders about the cause of the ultimate natural law itself. He asks, “What has determined the natural law?” However, we will focus on the attitudes of Kuki or Nanbu, which do not regard the natural law as the primal reality, and we will try to evaluate the significance of not asking for the ultimate law and its cause.

“Betweenness and Contingency: Watsuji and Kuki on the Logic of Encounter”

— Hans Peter Liederbach, Kwansai Gakuin University

Watsuji’s and Kuki’s investigations into the logic of encounter are similar in that they do not presuppose the assumption of self-sufficient individuals existing prior to any encounter. In this regard, Watsuji and Kuki are both endorsing theories of encounter that are based on an anti-subjectivist notion of human existence. However, they rather differ in how they develop their anti-subjectivism with respect to the logic of encounter. While Watsuji’s focuses on the interrelatedness of human beings, which rests on the ontic difference between two concepts of betweenness (*aidagara*), Kuki inquires into the metaphysical depths of encounter, while employing the modality of contingency. In my talk I wish to point out the possibilities

and limits of both accounts. Contrary to established readings claiming that Kuki's approach supersedes that of Watsuji's, I will argue that they are complementing each other. Both the ontological and the ontic dimensions of encounter have to be taken into account in order to give a phenomenologically valid description of its logic.

Panel 12: *Ueda Shizuteru*

“Being With and In Language: Understanding Ueda
Shizuteru's Concept of *Urwort* (根源語)”
— Yukiko Kuwayama, *University of Hildesheim*

In my presentation, I address Ueda Shizuteru's understanding of language in general and put it into dialogue with Kant's epistemology. Ueda begins by dividing language into two distinct dimensions, the real and the virtual (実と虚), which can be compared with Kant's conceptual pair of the sensible world and the intelligible world (Sinnenwelt und intelligible Welt). According to Ueda, the real is descriptive, while the virtual is poetic and thus able to describe the apparently impossible. Despite this view which divides language into two types, Ueda coins a provisional term, *Urwort* (根源語), which comprises pure experience, our consciousness of experience pure experience, and our being with language itself. I want to clarify this term, because it is crucial to Ueda's whole understanding of language.

If we follow the way Ueda presents his understanding of language, we notice a characteristic which the Kyoto School as well as Zen Buddhism share: an approach to language which is both differentiating (real vs virtual) and undifferentiating (*Urwort*), and which is better known by Nishida's term “absolute contradictory self-identity.”

We must ask ourselves two questions: Are we to understand this view of language as the end of thinking? Where

do we go after this approach? I indicate its normative character and the way it orients us towards practice: namely, that we should understand ourselves as being both with language (together with but distinct from it) and in language (always already one with it). However, there is the danger of thinking of only language's normative aspect and forgetting its freeing aspect—how the virtual dimension of language opens possibilities to us. These two aspects of normativity and freedom are yet another bridge to Kant through his ethics.

“Hollowness or Opening: Poetic Language in the Philosophy of Ueda and Heidegger”

— Adam Loughnane, *University College Cork*

Both Ueda and Heidegger diagnosed a danger in their times, which they believed stemmed from the representational use of language. The linguistic abuses in the media (elaborated by Ueda) or according to technology (in Heidegger) were endangering not just language, but human existence and the world. Although their proposed correctives differ in important ways I will consider, both philosophers explored the poetic idiom for its potential to “speak” outside of the representational use of language. Heidegger pursues this idiom for its potential to speak beyond the speech-silence dichotomy, in the “open” (offenheit), while Ueda considers poetic language for the possibility of utterance between objectivity and non-objectivity, or what he calls “actuality” (実の事) and “hollowness” (虚の事). In elaborating and also enacting their theories of poetic language, both Heidegger and Ueda consider the work of various poets. This presentation places the two philosophers in dialogue to consider their respective appeals to these poets. I will weigh the merits of their distinct approaches for a different being-in-the-world through poetic language. While Heidegger puts forth a redemptive volitional orientation within language as derived from the poets he focuses on (Rilke, George)

whose “song turns our unprotected being into the Open,” Ueda’s unnamed poet who “plays in hollowness while abiding in actuality,” might point the way to a more viable overcoming of representational language through an enactment rather than a description of poetic language.

Panel 13: *Interreligious Philosophy*

“Ignatian Spirituality and Zen Buddhism: An Example of
Inculturation and Interreligious Dialogues in Japan”

— Eriko Shimamura, *University of Tsukuba*

Although Japanese Christianity only has a short history, it has vigorously and dynamically developed its dialogue with the Japanese culture. Indeed, Early Jesuit missionaries in Japan have been exploring more creative and effective ways to communicate what they affirm and understand as the Christian faith. We can see such efforts (a blueprint of Japanese Christianity) in the *Compendium Catholicae Veritatis* compiled by Pedro Gomez (1535–1600 AD), *Catechismus christianae fidei* and *Sumario de la Casas de Japon* compiled by Alessandro Valignano (1539–1606 AD) etc.

In this presentation, I aim to examine how “Japanese” Jesuits, with the same dynamics, have succeed to establish Japanese Christianity in modern context, especially focusing on Fr. Kakichi Kadowaki S.J. (1926–). As a Jesuit, he internalizes Ignatian Spirituality, As a Japanese Christian scholar, he learns positively from Western Theology (the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition). Finally, as a “Japanese Jesuit” Zen Master, he tries finding the reality of God’s salvation in Zen Buddhism, one of the most influential religions in Japan.

In “Zen and the Bible,” Kadowaki says that Dogen’s readings of the Buddhist scriptures teach Christians about how to read the Bible. He points out the limitations of the Western approach to Christology. The Western approach is to read

the Bible through the head and the heart. Another approach, the way of prayer mediated by Zen practice, overcomes the Western theoretical approach to knowing the message of Jesus Christ. Learning through the body is essential for Zen Buddhism. Zen practice shows how we can encounter Jesus directly through our body and mind. Kadowaki argues that the proper way of reading the Bible requires both body and mind. To read the Bible through the body and mind shows us a new hermeneutics of the Bible. He tries seeking similarities between Jesus' way of addressing the Father and Zen Buddhism's way of addressing the transcendental being.

Zen Buddhism profoundly reflects the Japanese mentality. Thus Kadowaki's commitment to Zen practice not only gives an example of interreligious dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism, but also shows possibilities for constructing a Japanese Christology in terms of inculturation in the future. We will investigate how Japanese Christianity might explore its own way to express the truth of the faith as doctrines, to re-express doctrines that are affirmed as the truth creatively in Japanese cultural context.

“Pedro Gomez and the Japanese Buddhism in the 16th and the 17th Century”

— Naoki Kuwabara, *University of Tsukuba*

At the end of the 16th century, the Society of Jesus established a collegium (higher education institute) in Japan. Pedro Gomez (1535–1600) was a professor of the collegium. Gomez edited the material which he taught in the collegium and published them as the “Compendium Catholicae Veritatis (『イエズス会日本コレジヨの講義要綱』).” In the Compendium, Gomez introduces “De Anima” of Aristotle (322–384 BC) basically following the commentary of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). In this presentation, I will try to give an overview of the historic significance of Gomez' theory on the anima.

Gomez follows the Thomistic interpretation of the Aristotle's theory of the intellect. On one hand, Aquinas interprets the "active intellect" of Aristotle as inherent in a personal soul. The "active intellect" is the intellect that Aristotle himself declared to be immortal. On the other hand, Aquinas insists that the whole soul is self-existent and therefore it is an immortal "intellectual soul (*anima intellectualis*)". In short, the characteristic of the Thomistic interpretation that Gomez adopted was to emphasize the immortality of the human soul. Furthermore, Gomez writes down several chapters emphasizing the immortal nature of the soul based on the non-material character of the soul in addition to the introduction of "the soul theory" of Aristotle.

The above-mentioned points are important in the context of the situation in Japan at that time where Gomez played an active part. The Jesuits in Japan confronted Japanese Buddhism in those days. Among the forms of Japanese Buddhism of those days, the tendency of the "Tendai Hongaku Thought (天台本覚思想)" was dominant. The Jesuits considered that there is a tendency of the "Tendai Hongaku Thought" to be without moral norms. Therefore, the Jesuits criticized such a tendency by emphasizing the immortality of the soul as the ethical subject. The doctrine of the "Jodo-Shin-Shu [True Pure Land sect] (浄土真宗)" especially showed a common structure with that of Reformers because both emphasized the powerlessness of human nature. The Jesuits are well-known to have spearheaded what is known as the "Counter-Reformation". In Japan, they found opponents parallel with those whom they confronted in Europe. Furthermore, the Jesuits emphasized the intellectual nature of the human soul distinguished from that of animals and plants. They resolved to criticize the Animistic interpretation of the "*tathagatagarbha*" (如来藏).

Gomez emphasizing the immortality of the human soul set the background for such circumstances in Japan at that time.

“Kūkai as Philosopher”

— Paulus Kaufmann, *Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München*

The US-American metaphysician David Lewis characterised a philosopher as someone who doubts something that everybody else accepts as an evident truth. In this sense we can confidently assume that the Japanese monk Kūkai (774–835) was a philosopher. He not only doubted what most people believed about the world, but he also promoted the new positions of esoteric Buddhism in Japan that were highly controversial among the country’s intellectuals of the time. His treatise *Sokushinjobutsugi*, for example, starts with the question how Kūkai can teach that we can become Buddhas in this very body while all other schools agree that it takes eons until one finally reaches awakening. Kūkai thus was a thinker who called into doubt apparently self-evident positions and his courage in challenging common opinions seems to be a good reason to call him a philosopher. And this is actually what many people—such as Takagi Shingen, Thomas Kasulis, John Krummel, Gregor Paul, Peter Pörtner and others—do. There might be reasons, however, to doubt this common assumption. It could be argued—and actually has been argued—that Kūkai was not really a philosopher for the following reasons:

1. Kūkai was a promoter of the magical rituals of esoteric Buddhism.
2. Kūkai did not write philosophical treatises but primarily commentarial works.
3. Kūkai was very much engaged in political activities, trying to secure political and financial support

for his school.

4. Kūkai did not create new ideas, but only transmitted esoteric Buddhism to Japan.

5. In calling Kūkai a philosopher we might unconsciously follow the politically motivated project of Meiji-Buddhist apologetics to establish Buddhism as philosophy and not as religion.

In my talk I will try to answer the questions if and in how far these considerations should prevent us from calling Kūkai a philosopher. My attempt to answer this question makes it necessary to ask further and more general questions that are crucial for any study of (premodern) Japanese philosophy, namely the questions “What is philosophy?” “What is our interest in distinguishing philosophy from other intellectual activities?” “What is at stake when we attribute or refrain from attributing the adjective “philosophical” to a text, to a person or a discourse?”

Panel 14: *Intercultural Philosophy*

“Potential for Emancipation? Kyoto School as critical philosophy”

— Niklas Söderman, *University of Helsinki*

Approaches in critical philosophy can find a degree of natural affinity with the Kyoto School philosophy, at least in the Kantian sense of critiquing and judging the possibilities of knowledge, especially when we consider central concepts like Nishida’s notions of *basho* and affirmation-and-yet-negation, Tanabe’s absolute critique and Nishitani’s field of emptiness. They provide a potential basis for radical critique of our knowledge structures by establishing their relativity and one-sidedness, revealing the fundamental ambiguity of our description of them and thus leading to their destabilization.

The ultimate aim of this kind of stance towards language, thought, and reality can be found in radical subjective emancipation from one's thrownness among the established structures of knowledge.

It seems far less clear, however, whether this kind of critical stance directed towards subjective emancipation is extendable to social level and into a basis for an emancipatory critique of society. Kyoto philosophers have at times critiqued Western political and cultural hegemony, but their approach could hardly be called socially emancipatory or even particularly aware of issues of social justice. Their participation in the wartime debates, in particular, seems to underline the pitfalls of a non-emancipatory social critique and the danger of professional deformation in dealing with praxis through *theoria*. There is also a sense in their philosophy that they are partly captive to their own foundation due to setting up an East of their imagining as a counterbalance to the West they perceive, which may in effect make it hard for them to turn a critical lens on their own society.

The aim of this presentation is to explore why a philosophy that can question our foundational beliefs about the formation of the self and our identity would pay little attention to the social dimension and the self's relationship with its societal context. This means investigating whether this lack of attention is inherent to the Kyoto School's conceptual basis or attributable to issues outside it (such as wartime politics), and how it relates to an underlying social ontology of their view of the self. The critical stance of the Kyoto School, however, appears to provide tools for emancipation from ideology, but its philosophers seem to have done little to apply them. This presentation will investigate these and related issues in the Kyoto School's thought in order to enquire into this potential for social critique within their philosophy.

“The Indianization of European Philosophies in Japan: 哲学
(*tetsugaku*) as Critical Case”

— Lucas dos Reis Martins, *University of Hildesheim*

In his Vienna Lecture from 1935, Husserl refuses the possibility of an Indianization of European philosophy, in contrast to the general tendency of other peoples to be Europeanized: “There in lies something unique, which all other human groups, too, feel with regard to us [Europe], something that apart from all considerations of expediency, becomes a motivation for them—despite their determination to retain their spiritual autonomy—constantly to Europeanize themselves, whereas we, if we understand ourselves properly, will never, e.g., Indianize ourselves” (Husserl, *Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man*). Inspired by and looking through Iris Daermann’s *Strange moons of reason: The ethnological provocation of philosophy* (2005), I would like to outline the scope and limits of the following questions: Could the Japanese effort to Europeanize—modernize themselves produce the postponed Indianization of European philosophies (Daermann), as the task that Europe itself was not prepared to accomplish? What roles do Europeanization and Indianization play in 哲学 (*tetsugaku*)? The polysemic field of *Tetsugaku* encourages us to unfold the potentialities of these issues, and I intend to augment this effect as well with the sociohistorical polysemy of the word *Indio*—Indian, *Indigene*, Hindu—in a controlled equivocal way (Viveiros de Castro). With this I want to defend the thesis that Husserl—in a philosophical dimension and even four centuries later—repeats in his *Crisis* the same equivocal statement that Christopher Columbus made at the birth of European expansion, i.e., taking the foreigner—unknown and exotic—as Indian. Japanese philosophy is a meaningful paradigm and a fruitful field to investigate the possibilities of a project of Indianization of European philosophies. If in philosophy this project is always postponed within

Europe—i.e., Wittgenstein’s reading of Frazer—what can we learn from philosophizing outside Europe for these issues? Which possibilities emerge when a philosopher like Nishida Kitarō proposes to root a new kind of philosophy in the Japanese soil? Can the hybrid form of thought developing from this approach be called an Indianized type of philosophy? The development of these issues is understood as an answer to the question of the contribution of Japanese philosophy to a decolonized form of thinking.

Panel 15: *Nishida and the Modernity*

“Nishida and the Experience of Photographing”

— Filip Gurjanov, *University of Vienna &
Charles University*

In my PhD thesis, I am developing a phenomenology of photographing. While in the first part I deal with photographic images as such and with the question regarding their ontological status, in the second and third part I take a ‘step back’ and examine the ‘place’ where all photography originates from: the experience of photographing. It is in this context that I intend to make fruitful use of the early philosophy of Heidegger (in part II) and the late philosophy of Nishida (in part III).

In my presentation I thus intend to sketch out the main idea of part III of my dissertation. In Nishida’s framework, it’s possible to assert that the photographer is a “historical subject” (Nishida 2003: 164), embedded in a “historical world” (ibid.: 148). Furthermore, according to Nishida, the historical world moves from that which is made to that which is making. This means that—speaking with Nishida—every photo is a “poiesis”—a creative act on the part of the photographer—yet this very act can only take place “on the basis of the historical world” (Nishida 1990b: 122). Being embedded in such a more general dynamic movement (of the historical world), a pho-

tographer is engaged in “acting intuition” [kôiteki chokkan] (Nishida 2003: 149). She acts upon the seen, thereby producing images, making them “seen” by others.

The experience of photographing also has a unique temporal structure that I intend to describe with Nishida’s theory of time. The self-determination of the historical world temporally means self-determination of the “eternal now” [eien no ima] (Nishida 1990a: 108). Every photo is made in a particular moment that is being “frozen” and captured in the two-dimensional space of the photographic image. Yet, that which is photographed necessarily springs from a “limitless past” and has a potential to reach viewers in an open and “limitless future” (ibid.). The notion of photography as something ‘static’ requires reexamining, which can be done by focusing not so much on photos themselves, but on the act in which they are created. For this, Nishida’s philosophy can be a rich source.

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“Filling Nothingness: Considerations on the Posthuman from Nishida and Plessner”

— Alessio Gerola, *University of Twente*

In this paper, I explore the potential for concepts developed by Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitarô to add clarification about the effects of anthropo-technologies on the constitution of the posthuman subject. “Anthropo-technology” refers to those technologies that merge with human’s organic body

to form technological—brain implants, prosthetic limbs, and biomedical devices, to name a few. A common trait many posthuman theories share is the idea of originary prostheticity of human beings. To clarify, the shared notion that “we (as humans) have always been cyborgs” because we naturally employ technology to modify ourselves. From this stance, it can follow that anthropo-technologies are nothing radically new. However, I will argue that projects of technological alteration of human beings by means of anthropo-technologies defended on the base of originary prostheticity, seem to underestimate technological influence on the formation of the self. In particular, anthropo-technologies influence the ways in which the subject experiences reality, acts in the world, and relates to its social community.

In order to characterize the process of technological self-constitution of the posthuman, I will discuss Nishida's concepts of place and action-intuition. These concepts prevent a simplistic conceptualization of originary prostheticity. For Nishida, the self and the world co-constitute each other in a dialectical relation: placing the primary focus on the body—which mediates our relation with the world of objects and other subjects. Thus, the body navigates the world through action-intuition, a non-conceptual bodily relationship that, most importantly, can be cultivated to achieve a deeper experience of our being in the world, which Nishida sees as a non-dual access to reality. While originary prostheticity remains the starting point thanks to the process of co-constitution, our relationship with the world is not static but the object of a dynamic process of cultivation. A process, I argue, that technology can potentially interfere with. A comparison with Plessner's positionality and the similar anthropological views he proposes, further illustrate how Nishida can go a step further in specifying what is potentially at stake when thinking about the meaning and the nature of posthumanity.

I conclude that from Nishida's philosophical anthropology

two main insights emerge: First, the role of the community of other subjects as crucial place where the self is constituted. Anthro-technologies used for enhancement purposes could alter the way in which the members of a community interact, for example creating performance disparities, and thus the way in which the individual self emerges in interaction with its social context. Second, the danger of certain anthro-technological enhancements might lie in their potential risk to “fill” the self, which for Nishida is no-thing, forcing it in a technologically predetermined direction and depriving it of the dynamism of self-cultivation.

“Nishida et la physique quantique : Concomitance et complémentarité”

— Jacynthe Tremblay,

Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture

Au début du vingtième siècle, les fondements théoriques des mathématiques et de la physique se modifièrent de manière radicale. Le paradigme de la connaissance scientifique qui avait été utilisé jusque-là, à savoir la géométrie d’Euclide et la physique de Newton, perdit son statut de fondement de la connaissance. Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) fut l’un des témoins privilégiés de ces événements historiques. Ceux-ci impliquaient d’importants problèmes épistémologiques qui ne pouvaient échapper à son attention. Nishida s’efforça donc, à travers plusieurs essais portant sur la philosophie des sciences, d’apporter une réponse philosophique à cette « crise de la science ». À cette époque, un nouveau paradigme pour les mathématiques et la physique venait juste d’être établi, grâce à l’École de Copenhague et son interprétation cohérente de la mécanique quantique. Cette interprétation était basée sur le formalisme mathématique de Hilbert, ainsi que sur les théories de Bohr et de Heisenberg.

Dans ce contexte, ma présentation mettra l’accent sur le

« principe de complémentarité », typique de l'épistémologie du physicien danois Niels Bohr (1885–1962), lequel exerça une profonde influence sur la philosophie de Nishida à partir de 1936. Ce principe permet de comprendre la relation entre deux descriptions d'un même phénomène qui, bien que mutuellement exclusives, doivent être analysées ensemble pour rendre compte d'une situation de manière exhaustive. Nishida relia directement le principe de complémentarité à quelques-uns de ses concepts fondamentaux, par exemple la concomitance (*soku*), l'auto-identité absolument contradictoire (*zettai-mujun-teki jiko-dōitsu*), l'intuition agissante (*kōi-teki chokkan*), le corps historique (*rekishi-tekishintai*), de même que l'union corps/esprit (*shin-shin-gōitsu*). Cette présentation montrera que ces concepts sont semblables à la complémentarité de Bohr pour deux raisons principales. D'abord, ils mettent en évidence le caractère concomitant d'éléments du monde historique qui ont été habituellement considérés comme contradictoires par la philosophie classique (par exemple, la connaissance et l'expérience, l'un et le multiple, le sujet et l'objet, l'esprit et le corps) ; ensuite, ils accentuent l'incorporation de l'esprit humain dans les mondes matériel, biologique et historique.

Panel 16: *Contemporary Philosophy of Science, Epistemology and Psychoanalysis*

“The Dignity of the Body: A Philosophical Implication of the Japanese Organ Transplant Law Before Amendment”
— Masahiro Morioka, *Waseda University*

The Japanese Organ Transplant law was first established in 1997. In this law, a person was able to choose whether or not her death was to be determined in terms of brain death by declaring her prior declaration. This law was very unique in that it allowed people to choose between traditional death and

brain death. In 2009, the law was revised to allow family members of a brain-dead patient to decide whether to determine the patient's death in terms of brain death (when the patient had not declared her wishes). Japanese Organ Transplant Law became one that was very similar to those of other countries.

I believe that there was a unique view of life and the body behind the first law. In the first law, when a brain-dead patient has not made her prior declaration on the determination of brain death, her body is to be protected from any type of organ removals made by other people, even if such removals are to be made to save the lives of other suffering patients. This suggests that in the first law, there was the philosophical idea that the brain-dead body has its own dignity, and this dignity cannot be violated by other people's desire to survive. This rule holds true regardless of whether the brain-dead patient is considered to be dead or not. And this dignity is overridden only when the brain-dead patient herself has declared her wish to determine human death in terms of brain death.

Traditionally, human dignity has been attributed to human mind, particularly the personhood equipped with self-consciousness, free will, and rationality, not to the human body itself. However, the first law strongly suggests that there is a dignity that should be attributed to the human body. This might be an idea that can threaten the basis of European image of human beings. French bioethics law states that "Le corps humain est inviolable." Thus, French law seems to declare that the human body has its own dignity, however, with regard to organ transplants from brain-dead patients, this law is considered to ignore the dignity or inviolability of the human body. Is this because a brain-dead patient is "dead," or is this because a brain-dead patient does not have self-consciousness, or is this because inviolability is cancelled in order to "save" the lives of other people?

“Hiromatsu on the Valid and the Prevalent”

— Katsumori Makoto, *Akita University*

In his radical extension of the Marxian critique of reification to an analysis of the phenomenal world in general, Hiromatsu Wataru 廣松渉 (1933–94) develops an account of how meanings and values (such as truth, justice, and so on) subsist only as relational, intersubjective moments of phenomena and are thus historically and socially relative. At the same time, he cautions against any move—starting from this relativity of values—to justify the acceptance of the values that are actually intersubjectively shared. With the aim of overcoming this “conservatism,” he introduces a quasi-Kantian distinction between the two concepts, the “valid” (妥当的 *gültig*) and the “prevalent” (通用的 *geltend*): A value as it is espoused on the level of the *quid juris* is called valid, while a value as it is actually accepted in the sense of the *quid facti* is called prevalent. According to Hiromatsu, one is able to challenge the prevalent value and to counterpose to it a different, valid value. He makes, however, a further, complex point: Not only are prevalent values intersubjectively accepted, but valid values are—though commonly misconceived as objective and self-contained—also “warranted” solely by their becoming actually intersubjectively accepted. This is to say that valid values “must become” prevalent values. For Marxist philosopher Hiromatsu, this constitutes a crucial link connecting his philosophical thought with the dimension of social—and particularly social-revolutionary—practice.

Notwithstanding its philosophical and ideological significance, however, Hiromatsu’s account of the valid and the prevalent proves to have difficulties both intra-theoretically and in its practical implications. First, there arises the question of whether his viewpoint allows of the values that are characterized by their very resistance to becoming prevalent. Specifically, his theory can hardly deal with the paradox that

the value of ‘singularity’ is both realized and invalidated by its becoming intersubjectively shared. Second, while breaking with the conservatism of accepting the status quo, Hiro-matsu’s view that the valid value is warranted by its becoming prevalent implies a kind of future-oriented conformism. In other words, his vision of social change orients itself toward a replacement of the existing intersubjective conformity by another, rather than toward a radical critique of the very structure of intersubjective conformity.

Panel 17: *Zen and Intercultural Philosophy*

“Understanding Laughter, Laughter as Understanding: Irony and Comic as Thought within Japanese Culture”

— Lorenzo Marinucci, *University of Rome, Tor Vergata*

While the very first philosopher in the Western canon, Socrates, is pretty well known to have been an ironist, it is hard to find many other exceptions in the history of seriousness of Western thought. What has motivated the exclusion of laughter and irony from Western discussions on reality, thought and understanding? I would like to pose this question, and attempt a broader understanding of the continuum going from irony as a mode of denegation to the embodied phenomenon of laughter by observing in a phenomenological perspective three moments of hilarity within Japanese culture: firstly the divine burlesque of Ame no Izume no Mikoto in front of Amaterasu’s hiding, and the textual relation with the archaic aesthetic notion of omoshiroki (funny and beautiful) proposed by Okazaki Yoshie and Imamichi Tomonobu; secondly the Zen employment of laughter and irony as tool of understanding, concentrating on Ikkyū Sōjun’s modes of *fūryū* (“poetic,” “erotic,” “comic”); thirdly the double role of linguistic irony in Bashō’s school of haikai (literally “comic verse”), and its connection to the negative aesthetics of *sabi* according to Ōnishi

Yoshinori's system of Aesthetics. From this triangle of sources I would like to attempt an integrated definition of irony and laughter through the notion of "emptiness," in its linguistic, conceptual and embodied declinations.

"'Zen Robots' and the 'Yellow Menace': Western Anxieties,
Zen Buddhism, and the Problem of Intercultural
Interpretation"

— Eric S. Nelson, *The Hong Kong University of
Science and Technology*

While Zen Buddhism was embraced in Western counter-cultural movements in the 1950s and 1960s, and found advocates among some Western intellectual circles, prominent European and North American intellectuals and philosophers reacted negatively to its growing influence and sought to exclude it from proper philosophical discourses. In Europe, Heidegger commented in the 1966 Spiegel Interview on the danger of a Zen "take-over" (*Übernahme*) and the necessity of a Western confrontation with its own origins that cannot engage or incorporate Eastern experiences and sources. Unlike Erich Fromm, Frankfurt School critical theorists such as Adorno and Marcuse dismissed Zen as a new faddish form of irrationalism in exotic guise. This paper focuses on elucidating this historical context in its first part and analyzing the reception of Zen in Arthur Koestler and Sydney Hook in particular in its second part.

Arthur Koestler identified Bolshevism and Eastern philosophy and mysticism as the two greatest dangers to the modern liberal West in *The Yogi and the Commissar* (1945) and *The Lotus and the Robot* (1960). Koestler adopted themes from earlier Occidentalist thinkers such as Henri Massis who argued for the uniqueness and superiority of Western civilization and the threat of an Asian menace in *Défense de l'Occident* (1927). Koestler described his journeys to India and

Japan in his 1960 book in which he critiqued Zen, identifying it with images such as Samurai, kamikaze, and robots, as inherently amoral and illogical as well as an anti-individualistic, anti-democratic, Asiatic menace to Western ways of life and thinking. Sydney Hook's review of the book in the *New York Times*, "But There Was No Light" (March 5, 1961), mocked Koestler's anxieties and fears about the encroachment of Zen Buddhism and Eastern philosophies on the West, contending that they were already historically defeated by Western liberal modernity and irrelevant to serious intellectual pursuits. I examine the contexts and motivations of the debate between Koestler and Hook and consider whether this failure of intercultural communication enacts two forms of epistemic injustice and offers lessons for the practice of contemporary intercultural philosophy.

"Zen Person/Zen Revolution: How Classical Japanese Thought Can Help Us Change The World"

— Andrew K. Whitehead, *Kennesaw State University*

The paper aspires to articulate the unique strengths of a Zen Buddhist model of critique for the sake of subversion that is borne out of the distinct conception(s) of the person as articulated by thinkers such as Rinzai (Ch. Linji, d.866), Hakuin (1686–1769), and Ikkyū (1394–1481). Such an approach, being cross-cultural and comparative in nature (at least insofar as the paper draws on contemporary problems in a global context, and refers back to particular existential-phenomenological discussions of habituation, embodiment, and experience), highlights the aptness of classical Japanese philosophy as a meaningful paradigm for re-thinking possible avenues of critique and subversion in a contemporary context.

In considering the differentiation of the Japanese use of *hito* (人), *kojin* (個人), and *ningen* (人間), together with the more traditional Indian Buddhist distinction between *atman*

and *jiva*, the paper highlights the habituated realization and reification of the illusory or imagined self for the sake of and in the service of conventional intersubjective existence. In so highlighting, the paper will work towards introducing and developing the social-political strengths such a conception has in terms of re-thinking how one might go about critiquing and subverting deficient and defective social institutions. Such a reading is not altogether foreign, as will be evidenced through cross-cultural and comparative dialogue with thinkers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir, and others. Through a consideration of the existential-phenomenological modalities of possibility and actuality, the paper will argue that a more thorough and more consistent rendering of the subject on legitimate descriptive terms affords greater freedom in subjective and intersubjective projections of self and world. In other words, if it is true that the self is an object borne from the irrealizing functions of consciousness, and that, as Merleau-Ponty says, habituation is fragile, then we are free to change who and how we are. The paper will develop and apply this notion in reference to classical Japanese Buddhist writings, twentieth-century European writings, and twenty-first century problems.

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3. Pierre BONNEELS (Université libre de Bruxelles): L'empirisme tremblant du langage dans l'œuvre de jeunesse du philosophe japonais Ōmori Shōzō : Comment traduire les concepts logiques d'Ōmori Shōzō en français ?
4. André CHARRAK (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne): Comparaison et compréhension de soi. Sur les projections de la conscience historique en philosophie
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6. Montserrat CRESPIÑ Perales (Universitat de Barcelona): Sketches about Japanese philosophy of law -transplants, rejections and convergences
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8. Juan Ignacio García DE LAS PEÑAS Otero (U.N.E.D.): Nishi Amane and Auguste Comte: A Positivism Inheritance

9. Florencia DI ROCCO (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne): Étymologie, histoire et grammaire de la couleur au Japon : Kitahara à l'épreuve de Wittgenstein
10. Lucas DOS REIS MARTINS (Universität Hildesheim): The Indianization of European Philosophies in Japan: 哲学 (*tetsugaku*) as Critical Case
11. Simon EBERSOLT (INALCO & Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) : La rencontre comme phénomène originaire. Kuki Shūzō, phénoménologue de la contingence
12. Amanda Sayonara FERNANDES Prazeres (Universitat Pompeu Fabra): Nothingness and freedom: A Comparative Analysis between Nishitani Keiji and Meister Eckhart's Perspectives
13. Alessio GEROLA (University of Twente): Filling Nothingness: Considerations on the Posthuman from Nishida and Plessner
14. Francesca GRECO (Universität Heidelberg): The Possibility of Spatial Origins: A Cross-Cultural Approach to the Platonic *χώρα*
15. Filip GURJANOV (University of Vienna / Charles University): Nishida and the Experience of Photographing
16. Masaki HARADA (Kyoto University): Temps et ego de troisième personne comme fabrications du langage
17. Tatsuya HIGAKI (Osaka University): Ōmori Shōzō's Philosophy of *Kasane-egaki* (Superimposed Description)

18. Mika IMONO (Université de Strasbourg): Transformation du corps et de la conscience à travers l'apprentissage des *kata* (型)
19. Yū INUTSUKA (University of Tokyo): Watsuji and Nishida on the Predictability of Nature
20. David W. JOHNSON (Boston College): Fūdo 風土: History, Language, and Philosophy
21. Makoto KATSUMORI (Akita University): Hiro-matsu on the Valid and the Prevalent
22. Paulus KAUFMANN (Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich): Kūkai as Philosopher
23. Suguru KAWASATO (Nagoya University): Le point de vue commun sur l'art de Bergson et Zeami
24. Leon KRINGS (University of Hildesheim): Nishida's Theory of Embodiment: The Historical Body and Self-Cultivation
25. Akinobu KURODA (Université de Strasbourg): Où est le cœur? Une dernière philosophie d'Ōmori Shōzō
26. Naoki KUWABARA (University of Tsukuba): Pedro Gomez and the Japanese Buddhism in the 16th and the 17th Century.
27. Yukiko KUWAYAMA (University of Hildesheim): Being With and In Language: Understanding Ueda Shizuteru's concept of *Urwort* (根源語)
28. Hans Peter LIEDERBACH (Kwansei Gakuin University): Betweenness and Contingency: Watsuji and Kuki on the Logic of Encounter
29. Adam LOUGHNANE (University College Cork):

Hollowness or Opening: Poetic Language in the Philosophy of Ueda and Heidegger

30. Emmanuel LOZERAND (INALCO): Le potentiel philosophique de la langue japonaise
31. Michael LUCKEN (INALCO): Le « Japon grec » : réflexion sur l'imagination des cultures
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